The proposed solutions to the problem of evil can be broadly categorized into two overarching groups: a) defense and b) theodicy. In an initial formulation, the aim of presenting a defense is to demonstrate that a particular articulation of the problem of evil fails to show the incompatibility or improbability (implausibility) of theism. By contrast, a theodicy seeks to provide a plausible theistic account of why God commands or permits the existence of evil.
Some philosophers of religion, such as Swinburne, regard the project of theodicy as both possible and desirable. On the other hand, philosophers like Alvin Plantinga—who are themselves theists—tend to question the accessibility and adequacy of theodicies. Moreover, the problem of theological evil can be distinguished into three types: a) the theoretical problem of evil, b) the existential problem of evil, and c) the practical problem of evil. The theoretical problem concerns the logical and epistemic relations among propositions about God and His attributes, as well as propositions about evil. A common formulation of this problem asks: How can the existence of evil be reconciled with the existence of an all-perfect God? In a widely accepted taxonomy, the theoretical problem subdivides into two variants: the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil. The existential problem of evil concerns abstract propositions insofar as they pertain to human experiential life; it is not reducible to purely theoretical dispute but addresses the pain and suffering that individuals (and animals) endure. The question here is how a person can, in practice, endure evils to which they have been subjected while preserving a meaningful life and maintaining a continuing relationship with God. The practical problem of evil asks how, given the evils that afflict human society, one might diminish the intensity and scope of these evils and circumscribe their deleterious consequences. Typically, well-intentioned individuals and charitable institutions confront this problem and engage in practical efforts to combat evil.
Accepting this tripartite distinction leads to the conclusion that each problem requires its own appropriate method; it is not feasible to resolve all of these issues with a single approach. While the existential and practical problems of evil are typically addressed with the aid of clinical counselors, psychologists, or religious exhorters, solving the theoretical problem of evil necessitates theoretical and intellectual work by philosophers and theologians to analyze the problem with precision and to offer a coherent solution.
Recently, a critical approach to theodicy has emerged, termed “anti-theodicy.” Given that most criticisms of theodicy in continental philosophy have been framed within that milieu, critics have often not attempted to present a clear formulation of each critique or to specify a preliminary taxonomy of the cluster of criticisms. These critiques are sometimes categorized into three families: ethical critiques, epistemological (or pre-philosophical) critiques, and metaphysical critiques. In the present discussion, I focus solely on what I regard as the most salient methodological criticisms, outlined below.
a) Merely theoretical and abstract approach: Proponents of theodicy are charged with isolating the issue to the theoretical problem of evil, thereby neglecting the practical dimensions and confrontations with actual evil and its tangible harms. Conversely, advocates of theodicy tend to treat evil as a mental construct and overlook the external reality of evil and its concrete harms.
b) A second-order (observer) stance: Theodicists frequently speak from an external vantage point, never placing themselves in the position of victims of evil or those who actually suffer. Theodicies tend to treat evil not as a lived, first-person experience but as the experience of others, narrated by someone who reports the experiences of others.
c) Evasion of tragic language: Pain and suffering are inextricably linked to tragedy, and the observer’s discourse about them is, in a sense, tragic. By contrast, theodicy’s discourse is non-tragic and is thus ill-suited for empathy and for alleviating the sufferer’s afflictions. To address this criticism effectively, the preferred idiom is that of affect and felt experience; the theoretical and scholarly language characteristic of theodicy may lack practical efficacy.
d) Denying the mysterious aspect of evil: Theodicies effectively seek to solve problems that are not amenable to rational principles by this very method. They aim to render evil and suffering intelligible, whereas, at their deepest level, these phenomena are “mysterious” matters—beyond human capacity for analysis and comprehension.
Several considerations can be advanced in response to these criticisms. The divergence between theodicy and anti-theodicy rests on a fundamental disagreement within the domain of meta-philosophy concerning the nature, aims, and tasks of philosophy. Apparently, theodicists, who are largely situated within the analytic tradition, regard at least part of philosophy’s task as solving theoretical questions, while the implicit presupposition of proponents of anti-theodicy is that the sole task of the philosopher is to address practical (not theoretical) and concrete (not abstract) problems. Yet they never provide a compelling methodological justification for preferring their meta-philosophical stance over that of the theodicists.
Moreover, the distinction between the theoretical problem of evil and the practical problem of evil, along with their respective repercussions, deserves more serious treatment. If this distinction is respected, then the complete elimination of the theoretical problem of evil and its solutions (theodicies) would hold no meaningful force. Furthermore, adopting a second-order stance regarding evils should not foreclose the possibility of adopting a first-order stance, especially since, in some cases, one’s belief in the theoretical ideas arising from a second-order study of evils can aid in determining an appropriate first-order approach.
Additionally, the stronger claim of mystery attributed to evils by anti-theodicy critics has not been demonstrably established, and weaker interpretations of that claim do not conflict with the usefulness and reasonableness of theodicy work. Leaving aside these points, there appears to be a significant methodological error in anti-theodicy: an implicit or explicit tendency toward metaphysical essentialism regarding what theodicy is. The anti-theodicy project presupposes a unitary conception of “theodicy” that manifests uniformly across, or will manifest across, all intellectual traditions. In other words, given the diversity of theoretical markers that fall under the label “theodicy,” it seems that anti-theodicy proponents frequently treat all such theories as if they share a single underlying structure, or, equivalently, imply that the objections that may be raised against some of these theories apply universally to all of them.