Volume & Issue: Volume 14, Issue 1 - Serial Number 29, December 2025 
Original Article

Title: The Role of Miracle and Infallibility in the Epistemic Authority of Prophetic Testimony: An Epistemological Analysis of Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s View

Pages 1-24

Morteza Hoseinzadeh

Abstract This paper investigates the epistemological role of miracle (muʿjiza) and infallibility (ʿisma) in grounding the authority of prophetic testimony in the thought of Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. In the contemporary world—dominated by scientific rationality, empirical verification, repeatability, and falsifiability—religious beliefs face serious epistemic challenges. Unlike scientific knowledge, which relies on repeatable experiments and observable data, religious belief is often based on historical testimony and claims about the unseen. This raises a central question: how can one rationally trust the testimony of a prophet who claims access to a transcendent and unobservable realm?
Ṭūsī emerges as one of the most significant thinkers who constructed a systematic, rational framework for grounding trust in prophetic testimony. Drawing on Avicennian philosophy and Imāmī kalām, he proposes a three-stage model: (1) establishing rationally the existence of God, the possibility of revelation, and the necessity of prophecy; (2) confirming a particular prophetic claim through miracle, understood as divine authentication; and (3) grounding the continuing epistemic authority of the prophet’s statements in infallibility. This triadic model demonstrates that for Ṭūsī, belief in prophecy is neither blind imitation nor skepticism, but a rationally justified stance.
To contextualize Ṭūsī’s approach, the paper first discusses the epistemology of testimony. Testimony accounts for a substantial portion of human knowledge—covering historical, scientific, and everyday facts alike. Two dominant approaches structure the field: reductionism and anti-reductionism. Reductionists maintain that testimony is justified only when supported by independent evidence, while anti-reductionists argue that testimony is a basic source of knowledge, justified by default unless there is positive reason for doubt. In religious contexts, testimony becomes even more complex due to supernatural content, claims to infallibility, and the moral and existential implications of accepting or rejecting prophetic authority.
Ṭūsī’s epistemology of prophecy responds to these challenges in a structured manner. First, he argues that human beings need social life, which requires law, and only a divinely commissioned lawgiver can provide complete and flawless legislation. Moreover, human intellect alone is insufficient for grasping all truths—especially the details of divine commands and the nature of the afterlife—thus necessitating divine guidance. These arguments establish prophecy as rationally necessary, even before addressing any specific prophetic claimant.
In the second stage, Ṭūsī defines miracle as a supernatural act accompanied by public challenge (taḥaddī), which is beyond human capacity, inimitable, and occurring exactly as claimed by the prophet. These conditions transform a miraculous event into an epistemic sign. From an epistemological perspective, the miracle functions as external divine certification of the prophet’s truthfulness. Ṭūsī argues that it would be irrational for God to grant the power to perform a true miracle to a liar; thus, the miracle establishes the sincerity and veracity of the claimant. Once a miracle meeting the required conditions is verified, it becomes a sufficient argument for the truth of the prophetic claim.
The third stage focuses on infallibility. Ṭūsī defines infallibility as a divine grace that removes the motivation for sin or error while preserving human freedom. Infallibility guarantees that the prophet will not err in receiving, preserving, or conveying revelation. From the standpoint of contemporary epistemology, infallibility can be interpreted as maximal epistemic reliability. In reliabilist terms, the prophet’s cognitive processes consistently generate true beliefs; in virtue epistemology, the prophet exemplifies perfect epistemic virtue, thus possessing supreme epistemic authority. This means that once prophecy and infallibility are established, one is epistemically justified in accepting the prophet’s testimony without needing to examine each claim independently.
The article also addresses modern challenges such as religious diversity and Hume’s alleged circularity between miracle reports and prophetic testimony. Drawing on externalist epistemology, the paper argues that the mere existence of competing religious claims does not undermine the justification of a believer’s testimony-based beliefs. What matters is the reliability of the belief-forming process, not universal consensus. Regarding Hume’s charge of circularity, the paper explains that many miracles are reported by multiple independent witnesses, that Hume’s own argument relies on testimony to establish a “uniform experience,” and that in Ṭūsī’s framework, miracles operate alongside other rational premises rather than in isolation.
In conclusion, the study demonstrates that Ṭūsī provides a sophisticated and rational model for justifying prophetic testimony. By combining external divine verification (miracle) with internal epistemic security (infallibility), Ṭūsī constructs a framework that bridges classical Islamic theology and contemporary epistemology of testimony. His model offers valuable insights for current debates on religious epistemology, testimonial justification, and the rationality of faith.

Original Article

Explaining and Analyzing Fakhr al-Razi's and Mulla Sadra's Views on the Holy Verse; "So wherever you turn, there is the Face of Allah": A Comparative Study

Pages 25-47

mansoor abdollahi, ali babaei

Abstract The verse "Wherever you turn, there is the face of Allah" (2:115) has been pivotal in Islamic theological and philosophical discussions concerning the unity of existence (wahdat al-wujud), divine encompassing, and the nature of God's presence in the world. The verse seemingly suggests a ubiquitous presence of the "face of Allah" in all directions, which, if interpreted carelessly, could lead to anthropomorphic or even pantheistic understandings of God. Razi, recognizing this potential for misinterpretation, prioritizes preventing any inclination towards a spatial understanding of God. He argues that the verse's apparent meaning might create the illusion of God's presence in multiple spatial directions, necessitating a metaphorical interpretation of "face." Razi emphasizes that the verse does not imply God's physical presence in any direction, as God is transcendent and devoid of location, corporeality, or inherence. For Razi, "the face of Allah" cannot denote God's actual presence in a specific direction. Based on Ash'ari theological principles such as the negation of location for God, the complete otherness of creator and creature, and the necessity of interpreting ambiguous verses, Razi attempts to interpret "the face of Allah" in a non-corporeal, non-spatial, and non-existential framework. Aligned with his theological foundations, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi interprets the verse to avoid any existential understanding of God, explaining God's omnipresence as encompassing knowledge. According to Razi's interpretation, nothing escapes God's power, knowledge, and will. He emphasizes the correlation between knowledge and precise action in his works, considering this as the primary evidence for God's knowledge. Razi elucidates the verse by referencing corresponding verses such as 57:4, 58:7, and 43:84. He considers verse 2:115 as crucial in negating corporeality and affirming God's transcendence from material attributes. Consequently, Razi avoids asserting God's "actual presence everywhere," interpreting "the face of Allah" within the realm of divine knowledge and power rather than ontology. In contrast, Mulla Sadra analyzes the verse through his existential philosophy and the doctrine of the "transcendent unity of existence" (wahdat al-wujud). According to Sadra, the personal unity of existence, and the infinitude of God, leaves no room for any "other" to mediate the affirmation of God's knowledge. In this view, God's knowledge is established first, and apart from God's knowledge, nothing can be known, just as apart from God's existence, nothing can exist. The verse expresses the profound reality of God's sustaining and existential encompassing. God is not limited to any location, but His existential effusion is present in all beings. "The face of Allah" is the manifestation of the divine in the levels of existence. In Sadra's mystical view, God is observed in everything and in every direction. Because every being is a ray of God's existence, one can observe the divine face in everything according to one's existential capacity. However, the coexistence of the Creator with creation is not like the coexistence of bodies, or substance and accident, or spatial or temporal coexistence; it is even more intense than the coexistence of existence and quiddity. Mulla Sadra's interpretive and philosophical readings suggest that the verse indicates God's encompassing dominion and coexistence with all things. God's dominion implies that everything other than Him is sustained by Him, and their very existence and all their existential aspects exist through His effulgent bestowal. In Sadra's philosophy, the soul inherently possesses its own world and a dominion similar to its Creator's, which Sadra utilizes in explaining God's knowledge of all things. Thus, Mulla Sadra likens God's knowledge of the entire world to the knowledge of the soul and body.

Original Article

Analysis of Three Contemporary Theories of Divine Revelation within Scientific Frameworks

Pages 49-74

Javad Navaei, Reza Akbari, Hamidreza Ayatollahy

Abstract Introduction This analytical-comparative study examines three contemporary theological models of divine revelation proposed by Maurice Wiles, Arthur Peacocke, and Denis Edwards. Each thinker fundamentally critiques the traditional "verbal-propositional" view, where God directly transmits words supernaturally by arguing its incompatibility with science, scientific errors in scripture, and need for contextualization.   Maurice Frank Wiles Wiles destabilizes the foundation of the traditional theory of revelation through four main critiques: the incompatibility of supernatural intervention with the scientific worldview, the conflict between errors in the Bible and God's absolute omniscience, this theory's inability to explain the diversity of sacred texts, and its practical inefficacy. His solution is a shift from the model of "verbal transmission" to that of "human interpretation." According to Wiles, divine revelation is not a specific intervention but the general and continuous presence of God in the world. The authors of sacred texts, like art critics interpreting a work, have reflected and interpreted this general presence based on their own cultural and historical contexts. Therefore, the Bible is not the direct speech of God but a record of human experiences and interpretations of encounters with the divine. This perspective explains textual errors and shifts its authority from literalist objectivity towards its historical role in shaping faith communities committed to ethics and social justice.   Arthur Peacocke Peacocke, a scientist-theologian, challenges tradition notably through the lens of kenosis (divine self-limitation) and scientific coherence. Advocating "theistic naturalism," he rejects body-soul dualism, asserting God acts through natural laws and evolutionary processes. Revelation involves "reading the signs" of God in nature and history, constituting a continuum from general to special revelation. Sacred texts are dynamic records to be reinterpreted in light of new knowledge.   Denis Edwards Edwards approaches the issue from a Trinitarian perspective centered on the concept of "the vulnerability of divine love." He criticizes traditional theology for its individualistic interpretation of the Trinity, neglect of this vulnerability, and creation of an artificial duality between God's general and special actions. From his viewpoint, the essence of revelation is the manifestation of intra-Trinitarian love and an invitation for humans to participate in this loving relationship, not merely the transmission of propositions. This love is voluntarily vulnerable, compelling God to act through secondary causes and natural laws. In this model, the Holy Spirit, as the flow of divine love, operates within natural processes (from cosmic evolution to quantum events), and sacred texts are the product of this Spirit's cooperation with human imagination and experience in historical context. Thus, revelation is an interactive, relational process.   Conclusion These theories share a paradigmatic shift: reconceiving revelation from a specific, miraculous event to a universal, natural process. Commonalities include critiquing verbal-propositional models, emphasizing natural explanations, and acknowledging human agency. Distinctions lie in their frameworks: Wiles uses hermeneutics, Peacocke theistic naturalism, and Edwards relational Trinitarian theology. This shift mitigates science-religion conflict and universalizes spiritual experience but raises ongoing questions about textual authority and special divine action, as noted by critics like George Ellis.

Short scientific article

The Representation of Prophets in Cinema: The Tension Between the Sacred and Earthly Narrative

Pages 75-87

Arefeh Goudarzvand Chegini

Abstract The cinematic representation of prophets has always faced significant challenges, stemming primarily from the fundamental difference between the language of religion and the language of cinema. In the Abrahamic traditions, prophets are regarded as divine intermediaries, bearers of revelation, and moral exemplars, often characterized by qualities such as infallibility, sanctity, and mystery. Sacred texts such as the Qur’an, Torah, and Bible portray prophets as manifestations of the divine; yet, cinema, as a narrative and image-based medium, necessarily relies on elements such as drama, storytelling, and humanization. These factors can reduce the prophets’ transcendence to a tangible, humanized, and occasionally secularized form, creating a fundamental tension between the sacred in religious texts and the earthly narrative of film.
Key challenges in cinematic portrayals include excessive humanization, the erosion of supra-religious dignity, the omission or naturalization of miracles, and a tendency toward secular interpretations. While such depictions may foster audience identification, they risk desacralizing prophetic figures and reshaping public perception of these divine messengers. Additionally, cinema’s power to shape collective memory can cement these portrayals in the audience’s mind as definitive models, producing significant epistemological and cultural consequences. Nonetheless, some scholars argue that despite cinema’s secular and narrative-driven nature, the medium possesses unique aesthetic and semiotic capacities that can facilitate religious experience and engagement with the sacred. Film can not only represent religious content but also create a horizon for devotional experience, offering audiences the potential to encounter the divine.
This study adopts an interdisciplinary and analytical approach to examine this tension, focusing on key case studies such as The Passion of the Christ (2004), Noah (2014), Exodus: Gods and Kings (2014), The Last Temptation of Christ (1988), Life of Brian (1979), and Muhammad: The Messenger of God (1976). It investigates the narrative and visual mechanisms employed in portraying prophets. Some films employ strategies such as avoiding direct depiction of prophets, using indirect narrative perspectives, emphasizing the reactions of surrounding characters, and leveraging music and lighting to evoke a sacred atmosphere. A notable example is Mustafa Akkad’s Muhammad: The Messenger of God, which preserves the film’s spiritual ambiance while maintaining cinematic engagement by refraining from showing the Prophet’s face directly.
The findings indicate that the cinematic representation of prophets not only reflects the tension between the sacred and the earthly narrative but also reveals profound shifts in modern cultural perceptions of religious concepts. This article seeks to identify both the challenges and opportunities in these portrayals and to explore cinema’s role in redefining the place of prophets in contemporary culture.

Short scientific article

Prophetic Preaching as Resistance in the Age of Environmental Crisis and the Function of Sacred Texts in Contemporary Religious Discourse

Pages 89-106

Fatemeh Ahmadi

Abstract Extended abstract This article seeks to demonstrate how the application of the Bible as a methodological resource within practical theology—drawing upon Paul Ballard’s four modes of engagement and the Earth Bible team’s six principles of ecological justice—can become an effective instrument in religious preaching for addressing contemporary environmental crises. To reach a thorough analytical conclusion, the study unfolds the multiple dimensions of this approach and examines its implications at theoretical, practical, social, and spiritual levels. The Bible has always functioned as a living and dynamic source within the Abrahamic traditions. It not only conveys historical and religious narratives but also serves as a mirror through which humanity can perceive its own condition and engage in dialogue with the divine. Ballard’s four modes-Scripture as source, as worship and spirituality, as wisdom for theological reflection, and as the subject of empirical research-open a pathway for the Bible to move beyond its role as a historical text and become a practical tool for confronting urgent contemporary challenges. Among these challenges, the environmental crisis stands as one of the most pressing, demanding theological responses grounded in sacred texts. The Earth Bible team has further expanded this horizon by articulating six principles of ecological justice: the intrinsic value of the Earth, the interconnectedness of life, the voice of the Earth, the purpose of the Earth, shared stewardship, and the Earth’s capacity for resistance. These principles reframe biblical interpretation by viewing nature as a living entity endowed with agency. This perspective challenges anthropocentrism and directs theology toward an Earth-centered orientation. Within this framework, religious preaching must not only respond to human spiritual needs but also echo the voice of the Earth, calling communities to shared responsibility for creation. Preaching thus assumes a pivotal role. It is not merely the transmission of doctrine but a social and spiritual act capable of mobilizing communities. When the preacher, grounded in Scripture, exposes humanity’s sins in exploiting nature, the act of confession is enacted. Confession, long a precursor to repentance in religious tradition, here signifies acknowledgment of human errors in environmental destruction. Repentance, in turn, entails lifestyle transformation, reduced consumption, and acceptance of responsibility toward the Earth. In this way, preaching becomes a vehicle for returning to God through returning to the Earth. Analytically, this approach yields several significant outcomes. First, the epistemological dimension: applying Scripture through ecological justice principles reshapes our understanding of the sacred text, allowing the Earth’s voice to be heard alongside human narratives. Second, the spiritual dimension: preaching that emphasizes God as gardener and pruner invites communities into a collective spiritual experience of purification and renewal, fostering hope and resilience. Third, the social dimension: sermons that summon communities to ecological responsibility can inspire collective actions such as energy conservation, waste management, support for environmental policies, and participation in social movements. Fourth, the theological dimension: practical theology is liberated from exclusive anthropocentrism and redirected toward an Earth-centered theology, wherein God is recognized as the creator and gardener of all creation, and humanity’s relationship with God is mediated through responsibility for the Earth. The article also highlights resonances within Islamic thought. The Qur’an repeatedly warns against fasād fī al-ard (corruption on Earth) and emphasizes humanity’s trust (amāna) to safeguard creation. Thus, the Christian use of Scripture in confronting environmental crises can converge with Islamic teachings, opening avenues for interfaith dialogue. Finally, the study underscores the continuity between past and future. Historical sermons can inspire contemporary responses, reminding communities that confession and repentance are not only returns to God but also lessons drawn from the wisdom of predecessors. This historical consciousness alleviates the sense of isolation in facing today’s crises. In conclusion, religious preaching that employs Scripture alongside ecological justice principles can become a transformative force. It calls communities to confession, repentance, and social action, bridging faith and practice, God and Earth, past and future. The central claim of the article is that the Bible, as a living and dynamic source, can be harnessed in preaching to confront environmental crises. Such application reshapes our hermeneutics, links faith with ecological responsibility, and envisions God as the supreme gardener who prunes barren branches so that new life may flourish. Humanity, by embracing responsibility, participates in this divine work of renewal. Practical theology in the age of ecological crisis must therefore move toward an Earth-centered theology—one in which Scripture reflects not only the voice of humanity but also the voice of the Earth, preaching becomes both spiritual teaching and social summons, and faith is defined not only as individual devotion but as collective responsibility for creation. This trajectory offers a pathway through ecological crises toward a sustainable and hopeful future.

Original Article

The Neural Signature of Religious Experience and the Problem of Reductionism in Theology

Pages 107-130

Saiedeh Khoie, Sayyed Mahdi Biabanaki

Abstract This article investigates the concept of the neural signature of religious experience and examines its implications for the problem of reductionism in theology. In recent decades, advances in cognitive neuroscience—particularly through neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI, PET, and EEG—have made it possible to study religious and spiritual experiences empirically. These developments have generated growing interest in identifying neural correlates and recurring activation patterns associated with practices such as prayer, meditation, mystical states, and ritual engagement. Within this context, the notion of a “neural signature” has emerged as a way of describing relatively stable and reproducible patterns of neural activity that accompany first-person reports of religious experience. However, the identification of neural signatures raises a fundamental philosophical and theological question: does the discovery of neural correlates amount to a reduction of religious experience to mere brain activity? If religious experiences can be mapped onto specific neural networks, does this undermine their theological significance, or can such findings be integrated into a non-reductive framework? The article addresses this question through a theoretical–analytical methodology, engaging both neuroscientific literature and philosophical reflection. The first part of the article clarifies the meaning of “neural signature.” It argues that the concept should not be understood in a strictly localizationist sense—that is, as implying that religious experience is “located” in a single brain region. Rather, contemporary neuroscience increasingly emphasizes distributed network activity involving regions associated with self-referential processing, emotional regulation, attention, salience detection, and meaning-making. Religious experiences appear to involve dynamic reconfigurations among large-scale brain networks rather than isolated activations. Thus, the neural signature refers to a patterned configuration of neural processes that co-occur with specific experiential and intentional states. The article then turns to a critical examination of two influential approaches in the neuroscience of religion. The first approach emphasizes the reorganization of self-related neural systems during religious experience. It suggests that alterations in networks associated with self-processing and agency may account for feelings of unity, transcendence, or encounter with the divine. This perspective offers a powerful explanatory model grounded in cognitive and affective neuroscience, highlighting how shifts in neural integration can reshape subjective experience. However, the article argues that such an approach risks being interpreted in reductionist terms if neural mechanisms are treated as exhaustive explanations rather than as enabling conditions. The second approach stresses methodological humility and the distinction between levels of explanation. It maintains that neuroscientific findings describe the biological dimension of religious experience but do not adjudicate its metaphysical or theological truth. By emphasizing the limits of scientific explanation and the importance of interdisciplinary dialogue, this perspective resists simplistic reductions. Nevertheless, the article notes that even non-reductive neuroscientific approaches must clarify how different explanatory levels—neural, phenomenological, cultural, and theological—relate to one another without collapsing into dualism or incoherence. On the basis of this comparative analysis, the article proposes a non-reductive conceptual model for interpreting neural signatures of religious experience. The model rests on three interconnected principles. First, it adopts a framework of non-reductive co-emergence, according to which neural processes and experiential meanings arise together within embodied subjects. Neural activity is necessary for the occurrence of religious experience, yet it does not exhaust its intentional or semantic content. Second, the model affirms a distinction between explanatory levels without positing an ontological separation. Neural descriptions and theological interpretations address the same phenomenon from different but complementary perspectives. Third, the model underscores the intentional and meaning-directed structure of religious experience. Religious experiences are not merely internal states; they are directed toward perceived transcendent realities and are shaped by linguistic, cultural, and ritual contexts. The article also engages in a brief internal critique of the proposed model. It acknowledges that the model operates at a relatively abstract level and may be criticized for lacking precise operational criteria. Furthermore, the boundaries between explanatory levels may remain conceptually fluid. However, this fluidity reflects the complexity of religious experience as a multi-layered phenomenon rather than a weakness of the framework. By explicitly recognizing these limitations, the model seeks to remain open to refinement and empirical engagement. In conclusion, the article argues that identifying neural signatures of religious experience neither invalidates nor confirms their theological significance. Instead, such findings should be interpreted as illuminating the biological dimension of a phenomenon that is simultaneously neural, phenomenological, cultural, and theological. A non-reductive approach allows neuroscience and theology to enter into constructive dialogue without collapsing one domain into the other. The neural signature, properly understood, is not the final explanation of religious experience but a crucial component in a broader, multi-level account of human religiosity.

Original Article

A Critical Examination of the Relationship between Myth and Religion in Ernst Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms and Its Implications for the Philosophy of Religion

Pages 131-172

davood Vafaei Kia, Rasoul Rasoulipour

Abstract Extended abstract Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms is one of the most ambitious twentieth-century attempts to explain human culture without reducing its plurality to a single model of knowledge. A symbolic form is not a decorative sign placed over a ready-made reality; it is an active, historically embodied way in which experience is organized, objectified, and made shareable. Language, myth, religion, art, and science accordingly disclose different dimensions of a human world. Within this system, however, the status of religion remains ambiguous. Cassirer frequently discusses myth and religion together as mythical-religious consciousness, which encourages the view that religion is merely a developed continuation of myth. The present review article re-examines that assumption. Its central claim is that the relation is best reconstructed as continuity in origin together with rupture in structure. Religion preserves myth’s affective and symbolic resources, yet reorganizes their mode of reference, conception of the sacred, and understanding of agency and responsibility. The study employs critical reconstruction. First, it identifies Cassirer’s principal claims about symbolic mediation, mythical logic, and the development of religion in his major works. Second, it reconstructs arguments that are often dispersed rather than formally stated in those texts. Third, it tests the reconstructed position against contemporary interpretations and objections. This procedure also distinguishes Cassirer’s own terminology from analytical concepts introduced by the authors, including symbolic reductionism and functional encroachment. The aim is limited: the article asks what Cassirer’s framework can clarify in philosophy of religion, not whether it can replace metaphysics, theology, empirical anthropology, or political theory. Cassirer treats myth as an autonomous organization of experience, not as a defective scientific explanation. Its primary material is affect: fear, hope, wonder, dependence, and a sympathetic participation in surrounding life. Myth converts affect into public images, narratives, names, and rites. Its logic is expressed through the relative identity of sign and signified and of part and whole. A name, image, relic, or bodily fragment can therefore participate in the power of what it signifies. The same orientation shapes the central categories of myth. The sacred-profane opposition gives experience an affective and evaluative tonality; causality appears through contiguity, resemblance, and participation; space is heterogeneous and divided into privileged regions; time is qualitative, cyclical, and ritually repeatable; and number bears qualitative powers rather than merely measuring quantity. These features form a coherent symbolic world while still allowing ordinary, non-sacred practices to coexist with mythical ones. Religion continues myth because both emerge from symbolically articulated affect, ritual, narrative, and the distinction between sacred and profane. The decisive rupture begins when magical attempts to manipulate sacred forces prove inadequate and the sacred can no longer be treated merely as an impersonal power such as mana. Cassirer’s developmental account moves from momentary and functional gods toward personal gods who possess enduring identity and will. The divine becomes a ‘Thou’ who addresses the human person and calls for response. Correspondingly, human individuality is no longer dissolved in the tribe or totem but is constituted through accountability, promise, repentance, and ethical obligation. The transformation of sacrifice from magical exchange toward justice, self-giving, and moral holiness makes this break especially visible. Mysticism intensifies the tension between finite and infinite, but it does not eliminate mediation altogether: once communicated within a tradition, mystical experience still requires metaphor, narrative, poetry, ritual, or disciplined silence. In religious language, Cassirer undermines the positivist assumption that empirical verification exhausts meaning. Religious discourse is intelligible within an intersubjective network of narrative, prayer, ritual, ethical command, and experience; nevertheless, cultural objectivity does not by itself prove that a transcendent referent exists independently of culture. In science and religion, the theory identifies many conflicts as functional encroachments: science properly investigates measurable, causal relations, whereas religion articulates existential orientation, value, and the sacred. The creation-evolution debate illustrates the point. Evolutionary biology retains full authority over empirical claims about the history and diversification of life, while a creation narrative may organize qualitative time, purpose, and responsibility. Yet genuinely empirical religious assertions remain answerable to evidence, so symbolic interpretation cannot become an ad hoc device for immunizing belief. In religion and politics, Cassirer’s analysis of modern political myth shows how language, ritual, prophecy, and leader worship can sacralize worldly power. Ethical religion may resist this regression by protecting individuality and responsibility, but democratic legitimacy additionally requires equal rights, rule of law, freedom of conscience, and public criticism. Cassirer’s account has important limits. It provides no sufficient inter-form criteria for deciding between incompatible religious truth claims; it describes the semantic possibility of transition from magic to ethical religion without fully explaining its historical causes; and its transcendental method leaves the independent reality of God and revelation methodologically undecided. Its developmental vocabulary also bears traces of early twentieth-century evolutionism, while its hierarchy of expression, representation, and pure meaning can covertly privilege scientific rationality. Politically, Cassirer underestimates the roles of instrumental reason, bureaucracy, economy, media, and technology in modern domination and treats political myth too uniformly as pathological. These objections define the theory’s defensible scope. Cassirer is most useful not as a complete theology, theory of truth, or political philosophy, but as a critical grammar of culture: a framework for identifying modes of symbolization, exposing category mistakes, and resisting the reduction of every form of meaning to the standards of a single domain.

Original Article

A Critical Analysis of the Multiverse Hypothesis versus the Fine-Tuning Argument from the Perspective of Imam Philosophical Theology

Asad mahdiyyoon herab, samad behrouz, Gorbanali Karimzadeh gramaleky

Abstract "In contemporary cosmology, the 'Fine-Tuning Argument,' due to the astonishing precision of fundamental constants for the emergence of life, provides evidence for the existence of a conscious Designer. Conversely, modern atheism, seeking to evade teleology, proposes the 'Parallel Universes' (Multiverse) hypothesis as an alternative explanation to reduce cosmic order to a mere probabilistic accident. The aim of this research is to critically analyze this confrontation from the perspective of Imami philosophical theology. Drawing upon the principles of 'Final Cause' and 'Immateriality' (Tajarrud), the author argues that the multiverse hypothesis is not only empirically unverifiable but also shifts the problem of design to a higher level and cannot serve as a substitute for the First Cause. The results indicate that the multiplicity of universes, rather than negating the Designer, testifies to the extensiveness of Divine power and wisdom; thus, the probabilistic explanations of modern atheism represent a cessation in the face of existential complexities, rather than a genuine answer to them."

Original Article

A Critique of Feuerbach’s “Religious Naturalism” in Light of the “Reality of the Sacred”: With Particular Emphasis on The Essence of Religion

sajad dehghanzadeh

Abstract Religious naturalism is one of the major foundations of secular explanations of religion in the modern era, finding a prominent expression in the thought of Ludwig Feuerbach. In The Essence of Religion, Feuerbach shifts the focus of analysis from the divine to the relationship between human beings and nature, interpreting religion in terms of human dependence, needs, and desires. Employing a critical analytical method and focusing on the content of this work, the present study examines whether Feuerbach’s naturalistic account of religion can adequately explain the entirety of religious experience and the reality of the sacred. It argues that although Feuerbach offers insightful observations concerning the human origins of certain elements of religion, he fallaciously moves from this explanation to the denial of the independence and reality of the sacred. The findings indicate that reducing the sacred to nature and human needs conflates two distinct levels of inquiry: explaining the origins of religious belief and assessing the truth of its object. Consequently, a naturalistic analysis alone cannot disprove the transcendent reality of the sacred. Furthermore, epistemological critiques and phenomenological approaches to religion demonstrate that religious experience encompasses dimensions that cannot be fully reduced to a naturalistic framework.