Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Jostarhaye Falsafeh Din)

Abstract Extended abstract Religious transformation constitutes one of the most profound expressions of human self-transcendence. It is not a mere alteration of propositional beliefs, nor simply a shift in emotional attitude or moral commitment, but a reconfiguration of the very structures through which reality is perceived, valued, and inhabited. Such transformation involves a metamorphosis of epistemic perspective: the subject who emerges from it is not epistemically continuous with the one who entered it. The distinctive feature of transformative experience lies in this dual character—its epistemic unpredictability before the event and its constitutive alteration of identity afterward. No agent can foresee what she will come to know, desire, or become through such a passage; the epistemic standpoint required for rational evaluation arises only after the experience has already occurred. Hence, the decision to embrace or resist transformation inaugurates a paradox of rational agency: a choice that must be made in the absence of the very knowledge by which it could be justified. Within the domain of religion, this paradox acquires an existential depth. Conversion, de-conversion, or any radical shift of faith confronts a person with an earlier self whose worldview, affective orientation, and sense of reality have been left behind, yet remain intelligible. The ensuing tension—disagreement with one’s former self—poses a distinctive epistemic problem. Two epistemic agents, the “old self” and the “new self,” occupy incompatible doxastic positions, each considering the other mistaken. The question that arises is not only which of the two is right, but how rational appraisal is even possible when the very criteria of evaluation have themselves been transformed. Treating this intrapersonal conflict as a genuine case of disagreement reveals that epistemic humility, rather than certainty, becomes the hallmark of rational integrity. In such situations, independence of judgment must extend inward. Rationality requires the transformed self to resist uncritical confidence in its new standpoint, to acknowledge the epistemic standing of its former convictions, and to seek a mode of dialogue that honors both voices within. The possibility of this internal dialogue depends on whether meaning and justification can be sustained without collapsing into subjectivism. If, as Wittgenstein insists, language and understanding are irreducibly social, then an inner conversation is not a private soliloquy detached from shared norms but rather an internalized form of public reasoning. The self that argues with itself reenacts, within the boundaries of consciousness, the dialogical structures of communal discourse. Genuine intrapersonal dialogue, therefore, presupposes the agent’s capacity to inhabit both perspectives under the discipline of shared rational standards. The Augustinian narrative provides a paradigmatic instance of such an internal dialogue. In Confessions, Augustine does not merely recount a psychological crisis but stages a philosophical drama between his divided selves: the restless seeker and the repentant believer. Through an empathetic reconstruction of his past, rational engagement with his former reasoning, and a normative reorientation of will and intellect toward the good, Augustine exemplifies the possibility of reconciling cognitive transformation with rational accountability. His confession is simultaneously an act of self-interpretation and epistemic justification—a demonstration that conversion need not signify the abdication of reason but rather its transfiguration through love and understanding. The integration of will and intellect in this process reveals that rationality is not exhausted by inference or evidence; it includes the virtues of courage, integrity, and openness to truth. The decision to embark on the transformative path, though made under epistemic uncertainty, can manifest an intellectual virtue—a form of epistemic courage that participates in the moral structure of reason itself. Such a conception of rationality dissolves the opposition between faith and reason: faith becomes the will’s participation in truth under conditions of incomplete knowledge. Disagreement with the former self, viewed in this light, ceases to be a sign of irrationality or inconsistency. Rather, it represents a moment of reflective distance in which reason confronts its own historicity and growth. The self is not a fixed locus of belief but an ongoing narrative in which different epistemic perspectives contend, converse, and are ultimately integrated. To be rational, then, is not to remain unchanged but to learn how to live intelligibly through change—to transform without disowning one’s past and to preserve continuity within conversion. Religious transformation, understood in this way, reveals the dynamic unity of knowledge, will, and selfhood: an epistemology not of detachment but of participation, in which rationality itself becomes a mode of faithfulness to the unfolding truth of the human soul.

Abstract In contemporary religious epistemology, considerable attention has been devoted to justifying religious beliefs by appealing to testimony as a source of knowledge. Philosophers such as Mats Wahlberg have developed the model of “revelation as testimony,” aiming to defend the rationality of religious belief by treating revelation as a form of testimonial evidence. In this paper, we examine two significant limitations of this model, focusing specifically on the metaphysics of testimony. As Jennifer Lackey emphasizes, testimony is metaphysically realized only if the hearer comes to believe a proposition p on the basis of the content of the speaker’s testimony. This condition entails two essential components: (a) a semantic connection between speaker and hearer; and (b) the hearer’s deference and trust in the speaker. Each of these components imposes limitations on the ‘revelation as testimony’ model, as detailed below. a) Semantic connection between speaker and hearer According to this condition, if the audience does not understand the meaning of the speaker’s proposition, they cannot form a belief merely by trusting testimony. As Wahlberg illustrates with a scientific example, one may trust physicists and come to believe that “the (relativistic) mass of an object increases as its velocity increases” only if one understands the meaning of the proposition. Understanding the proposition requires comprehension of its constituent terms, such as “mass” and “velocity.” Accordingly, children, individuals with severe cognitive impairments, illiterate or semi-literate persons, or anyone who does not understand the meaning of the propositions in the Bible or the Qur’an cannot form beliefs based on deference to testimony. In other words, testimonial justification presupposes a certain level of semantic and conceptual understanding on the part of the hearer. b) Deference and trust in the speaker The second component of testimonial belief is that it is formed and sustained through deference to the authority of another. A belief based on testimony depends on the credibility and reliability of the speaker. Therefore, if a person already believes p on independent grounds - for instance, through a philosophical argument for divine simplicity - the mere assertion of p in revelation does not render that belief testimonial. Philosophers such as Wolterstorff, Kenny, and Gillson emphasize that in the case of religious belief, faith in revelation involves deference to God as the ultimate epistemic authority. A potential objection arises from the epistemological concept of mixed grounds, whereby a belief may be justified by multiple epistemic sources simultaneously. One might argue that in the case of revelation, it is permissible for a belief to be grounded both in argument and in the testimony of the Qur’an. However, this objection does not undermine the constraints highlighted above. In the epistemology of testimony, even the most robust advocates of deference, such as Zagzebski, maintain that epistemic autonomy is an ideal to be pursued. Reliance on deference is justified only when independent epistemic faculties are either incapable of reaching the truth or are more likely to lead to error than the belief obtained by trusting another. In conclusion, testimonial justification of revealed belief is limited. It is only available to those who (i) possess sufficient understanding of the meaning of the revealed propositions, and (ii) lack conclusive independent reasons to believe these propositions apart from revelation. These two conditions highlight the epistemic boundaries of the “revelation as testimony” model, suggesting that testimonial justification cannot universally apply to all hearers.  

Abstract The philosophical view of "revelation" has at least two basic parts: the ontology of revelation and the epistemology of revelation. The ontology of revelation looks at this phenomenon in terms of its reality and existence, and the epistemology of revelation examines its status as a source of knowledge and representation. The treatise Fusūs al-Hikmah (attributed to al-Farabi) is a philosophical-mystical text that, by presenting a philosophical explanation of prophecy, examines the phenomenon of revelation in terms of its reality and existence, as well as its various types and ways, and opens an important chapter in the "ontology of revelation."Accordingly, the topics of the present article are divided into three sections: "Psychology of the Prophet", "Angelology" and "Ontology of Revelation". In this treatise, the Prophet - who is in the rank of "holy soul" - possesses the highest level of intuitive perception because he can receive true knowledge both directly from the Guarded Tablet (divine knowledge) and through the channel of revelation (in its special sense), which takes place mainly through the mediation of an angel. However, the essence of an angel has two aspects or two modes of existence: the real aspect (existence in itself) and an aspect in analogy with humans (existence in relation). The angel's "existence in itself" originates from the heavenly world (Malakut) and abstract affairs, so it lacks a body and material accidents and has no form or shape, and therefore cannot appear and be evident to the Prophet's senses; although the Prophet's holy soul can have a special spiritual encounter with him and receive such revelation. However, the angel's "existence in relation" has the power to appear and manifest itself to the Prophet. The angel can "represent" himself to the Prophet through this essence or existence. In such a situation, the Prophet's senses are attracted to the higher world and a form of an angel is represented to him according to his tolerance and capacity, and the angel's speech is heard in the form of revelation. Such representation occurs in the Prophet's "imagination" - which is one of the inner senses. Therefore, receiving prophetic revelation from an angel is in two ways: without the representation of an angel (direct or true revelation) and with the representation of an angel (mediated or representational revelation). The first way is more difficult because it is completely far from human habits, but the second is not.

Abstract The notion of formal maturity (al bulūgh al ṣūrī) is one of the innovative and underexplored concepts within the system of Transcendent Philosophy (Ḥikmat al Mutaʿāliyah). Although Ṣadr al Mutaʾallihīn introduces this concept for the first time and assigns to it a foundational role in explaining the developmental trajectory of the human soul, it has received little attention in post-Sadrian philosophical literature. In Ṣadrā’s view, formal maturity is not merely a biological or psychological stage, but rather an ontological rank within the soul’s process of intensification and existential perfection. It marks a decisive turning point in the soul’s substantial motion, wherein the human soul acquires new actualities that enable its transition toward higher perfections, especially spiritual maturity. Employing an analytical–deductive method and grounded in the principles of Transcendent Philosophy, this study seeks to reconstruct, systematize, and elucidate this concept and to clarify its place within Ṣadrā’s philosophical framework. Within Ḥikmat al Mutaʿāliyah, the human soul is a graded and modulated reality whose genesis is corporeal and whose subsistence is spiritual. It originates from the body (ḥudūth jis̱mānī) and, through substantial motion (ḥarakah jawhariyyah), gradually ascends toward higher degrees of immateriality. Ṣadrā maintains that the soul, at the outset of its emergence, is identical with the body and belongs to the order of matter; yet through continuous existential intensification, it traverses the vegetative, animal, imaginal, and finally the rational and intellectual levels. Formal maturity is the stage at which the animal soul reaches the highest degree of imaginal intensity and becomes prepared to receive the rational soul and the intellectual faculties. Thus, formal maturity is not a fixed chronological moment but a gradational process that begins at birth and culminates at a specific existential threshold. Ṣadrā describes formal maturity with expressions such as “animal maturity,” “the moment of the emergence of the rational soul,” “the stage of formal intensification,” and “the beginning of rationality.” He argues that from birth until formal maturity, the human being is a “human animal in act and a human being in potency”—possessing sensory and imaginal cognition but not yet having attained rational and intellectual actuality. At the onset of formal maturity, the rational soul comes into being, and the practical intellect becomes actual, while the theoretical intellect remains in its hylic (potential) state. This point constitutes one of the major theoretical challenges in interpreting formal maturity, for in the Peripatetic tradition, the theoretical intellect is considered prior to the practical intellect. Ṣadrā, however, insists on the priority of the practical intellect’s actualization. This study demonstrates that such priority arises from the existential nature of the practical intellect in Sadrian philosophy: the practical intellect is a mode of discernment and deliberation intrinsically tied to voluntary action and moral choice, and thus it attains an initial and rudimentary actuality from the very moment the rational soul emerges. One of the most significant consequences of formal maturity is the transformation in the soul’s mode of attachment to the body. Ṣadrā holds that prior to formal maturity, the soul’s attachment to the body is an “existential and individuating attachment,” meaning that the soul depends on the body for its very existence and individuation. After formal maturity, however, this attachment becomes a “perfection-oriented attachment,” such that the soul no longer requires the body for its existential subsistence but employs it as an instrument for acquiring further perfections. This shift marks a profound ontological transition and reveals that formal maturity is not merely a biological development but a transformation in the very structure of the soul’s relation to embodiment. From Ṣadrā’s perspective, formal maturity is the stage at which the human being attains incipient rationality—the capacity for thought, deliberation, judgment, and voluntary choice. The practical intellect is actual at this stage, enabling the human being to engage in moral and purposive action. The theoretical intellect, however, remains potential and can only reach full actuality through continued substantial motion and divine assistance. Hence, formal maturity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for spiritual maturity. All human beings reach formal maturity, but only a select few attain spiritual maturity and the actuality of the theoretical intellect. This study further shows that although formal maturity provides the groundwork for spiritual ascent, it can simultaneously become the greatest obstacle to it. Ṣadrā explicitly states that at the height of formal maturity, the soul is intensely preoccupied with the body and the natural world; this deep immersion in corporeal concerns may distract the human being from its true origin and ultimate perfection. Thus, formal maturity is a dual-edged stage: on the one hand, it marks the beginning of rationality and the possibility of transcendence; on the other, it represents the peak of corporeal engagement and the risk of spiritual neglect. The final section of the study examines the relationship between formal maturity, spiritual maturity, and juridical (sharʿī) maturity. Juridical maturity is a legal threshold of religious responsibility based on biological indicators, whereas formal maturity is an ontological stage defined by imaginal intensification and the emergence of the rational soul. Spiritual maturity, by contrast, is the stage at which the theoretical intellect becomes actual, and the human being attains the rank of the actual intellect and the sacred soul (al nafs al qudsiyyah). The study demonstrates that these three forms of maturity belong to distinct domains: juridical maturity pertains to legal obligation, formal maturity pertains to the emergence of rationality, and spiritual maturity pertains to the actualization of intellectual perfection. In conclusion, this article reconstructs a coherent account of formal maturity by synthesizing the dispersed remarks of Ṣadr al Mutaʾallihīn and demonstrates that this concept constitutes the mediating link between the animal soul and the human rational soul, marking the initial emergence of rationality and volition. Formal maturity is the stage at which the human being acquires foundational actualities, without which the ascent toward spiritual and intellectual perfection would be impossible. By elucidating this stage, the study highlights the philosophical significance of formal maturity for understanding the developmental ontology of the human soul in Transcendent Philosophy.

Abstract This article examines Ḥusn ʿAbbūd’s egalitarian re-reading of Mary (Maryam) in the Qur’an, with a particular focus on her argument that Mary possesses the defining prophetic qualities typically attributed to the anbiyāʾ in the Islamic tradition. Drawing on a wide range of classical exegetical sources, ʿAbbūd identifies a distinctive status for Mary-one that, in her view, aligns with the essential features of prophethood. Although ʿAbbūd does not offer a systematic classification of these qualities, her analysis implicitly reveals a coherent set of prophetic markers. The present study reconstructs, systematizes, and critically evaluates these markers in four primary categories: divine election (iṣṭifāʾ), the appearance of mojeze, reception of divine revelation, and substantive analogies between Mary and other Qur’anic prophets, especially the Prophet Muḥammad. - First, the article explores ʿAbbūd’s argument that Mary’s prophetic identity begins with her divine election. Classical exegesis notes that Mary is uniquely chosen twice: first, for exclusive service and devotion in the sanctuary, and second, for the miraculous conception of Jesus. According to ʿAbbūd, both acts of divine election parallel the Qur’anic use of iṣṭifāʾ for Adam, Noah, and the Abrahamic line-figures unanimously recognized as prophets. This study further highlights ʿAbbūd’s emphasis on the matrilineal elements within the House of ʿImrān, noting that this emphasis supports an egalitarian re-reading of prophetic legitimacy beyond androcentric constraints. - Second, the article examines the role of miracles in ʿAbbūd’s reasoning. The recurring extraordinary provisions granted to Mary in the sanctuary-such as the miraculous conception, the palm tree that nourishes her during labor, and the spring that emerges at her feet-all function, in ʿAbbūd’s analysis, as prophetic mojeze, rather than mere karamāt. Although many theologians distinguish Mary’s extraordinary experiences from technical miracles, ʿAbbūd contends that their narrative function within the Qur’an aligns closely with miracles as signs of divine commissioning. - Third, the article discusses ʿAbbūd’s claim that Mary receives divine revelation. Qur’anic verses in which angels directly address Mary, announce her chosenness, command her to worship, and deliver divine messages serve-as ʿAbbūd argues-as explicit indications of waḥy. Classical exegetes of Andalusian origin also considered such angelic communication a strong indicator of prophetic status. Moreover, later theological tradition lists verbal revelation, purity, and divine communication as core prophetic traits-all of which, as shown in this study, appear in Qur’anic depictions of Mary. - Fourth, the study evaluates the parallels ʿAbbūd and other scholars draw between Mary and Muḥammad. Both figures receive a divine message, experience opposition from their communities, undergo hardship, and stand out through extraordinary conditions-Mary’s virginity and Muḥammad’s illiteracy. By framing Mary and Muḥammad as bearers of divine “Word” -Mary through Jesus and Muḥammad through the Qur’an-ʿAbbūd strengthens her case for Mary’s prophetic rank. In conclusion, this article demonstrates that ʿAbbūd’s position resonates with a broader egalitarian interpretive movement that seeks to uncover neglected female prophetic models within Islamic scripture. While classical exegetical discourse often avoided applying the title nabī to Mary due to male-centered paradigms, the combined evidence of election, miracle, revelation, and analogical parity presented by ʿAbbūd forms a robust argument for recognizing Mary as a prophet within the Qur’anic worldview.

Abstract Plato’s doctrine of the immortality and indestructibility of the soul exerted a profound and lasting influence on the development of Christian theology. While early Christian thinkers such as Justin Martyr initially resisted this philosophical notion, preferring instead to emphasize the biblical portrayal of humanity as a unified and mortal being dependent upon God’s gift of life, the trajectory shifted significantly in the third century with the emergence of Origen. His synthesis of Christian faith with Platonic categories marked a turning point, after which the idea of the soul’s inherent immortality became increasingly dominant. The Alexandrian Fathers, despite their vigorous defense of Christian doctrine, inadvertently opened the door for Platonic anthropology to enter the theological discourse. This intellectual pathway was later consolidated by medieval scholastics such as Thomas Aquinas, who gave systematic expression to the Platonic view within the framework of Christian theology. By the sixteenth century, the Catholic Church formally declared the doctrine of the soul’s mortality to be heretical. This institutional decision entrenched the Platonic understanding of the soul as orthodox teaching. Yet the Protestant Reformers, most notably Martin Luther, rejected this position, describing the notion of an inherently immortal soul as a “monstrous fable.” The tension between these perspectives highlights the contested nature of the doctrine and underscores the role of figures such as Tertullian, Origen, and Augustine in transmitting Platonic anthropology into the Christian tradition. Their writings reveal how concepts of death, resurrection, and final judgment were reinterpreted under the influence of Greek philosophy, with immortality increasingly regarded as an intrinsic property of the soul rather than a divine gift. The debate has not subsided in modern times. Contemporary theologians remain divided: some continue to defend the traditional doctrine of the soul’s immortality as integral to Christian faith, while others argue that the doctrine is essentially a Greco-Roman inheritance lacking genuine biblical foundation. A growing number of scholars emphasize that, although the doctrine remains the dominant view, it is increasingly perceived as a post-apostolic innovation. The observation that “something does not quite fit” captures the enduring unease surrounding the issue. This article situates the Platonic doctrine of the soul’s immortality within the broader context of early Church theology by examining the semantic range of key biblical terms such as nephesh in Hebrew and psyche in Greek. These terms, when read in their scriptural context, portray humanity as a finite and dependent being whose existence is contingent upon God’s sustaining breath. In contrast, Plato conceived of the soul as autonomous, eternal, and separable from the body. The adoption of Platonic categories by the Church Fathers thus represented a significant departure from the biblical worldview. Under this influence, the Christian understanding of eschatological realities—death, resurrection, and final judgment—was reshaped, and immortality came to be seen not as a divine gift but as an inherent attribute of human nature. The theological consequences of this shift were far-reaching. By redefining the soul as intrinsically immortal, the Church altered its conception of divine justice and mercy. The fate of the wicked, the meaning of resurrection, and the nature of eternal judgment were all reframed in light of Platonic anthropology. This transformation continues to shape Christian theology today, even as scholars debate whether the doctrine represents authentic revelation or a philosophical accretion. Ultimately, the study demonstrates that the Platonic shadow over Christian thought has not only influenced doctrinal formulations but also reshaped the very image of God’s justice and compassion within the Christian tradition.

Abstract Extended abstract This article explores the relationship between the possibility of intelligent extraterrestrial life and the doctrine of human superiority-often expressed in Islamic discourse as the belief that human beings are the “noblest of creatures.” With rapid developments in astrobiology and increasing scientific interest in life beyond Earth, long-standing theological assumptions regarding humanity’s unique status in creation have come under renewed scrutiny. The central question addressed in this study is whether the acceptance of intelligent extraterrestrial beings poses a challenge to Islamic theology or undermines the moral and ontological dignity traditionally attributed to human beings. The article argues that Islamic theology not only allows for the possibility of extraterrestrial life but also offers rich philosophical and mystical resources for its coherent theological interpretation. The study begins by examining the position of Islamic sacred texts regarding extraterrestrial life. It demonstrates that the Qur’an and prophetic traditions do not contain any explicit affirmation or denial of intelligent life beyond Earth. This textual silence should not be interpreted as a rejection of such a possibility. Rather, within Islamic hermeneutics, silence often signifies a suspension of judgment that leaves room for rational inquiry and interpretive openness. As such, the absence of direct textual reference neither negates the possibility of extraterrestrial life nor renders it theologically problematic. Instead, it provides a conceptual space in which philosophical and theological reflection may operate. The article then turns to Islamic philosophy, particularly the Peripatetic and post-Avicennian metaphysical traditions. Drawing on the theory of emanation, the principle of proportionality between cause and effect, and the doctrine of gradation in being (tashkīk al-wujūd), it is argued that multiplicity and diversity necessarily increase as existence descends from the First Principle. The material world, as the lowest ontological level, is therefore characterized by maximal plurality, change, and differentiation. From this metaphysical perspective, restricting life exclusively to Earth lacks philosophical justification and is inconsistent with the internal logic of Islamic metaphysics. This argument is further reinforced through modal reasoning, showing that the proposition “intelligent extraterrestrial life exists” is at least metaphysically possible, since it entails no logical contradiction. In addition to philosophical analysis, the article engages Islamic mystical thought, particularly the doctrine of divine names and attributes. Central to this discussion is the divine name al-Ḥayy (the Living). According to Islamic mysticism, God is infinite being whose names and perfections must manifest in diverse forms across multiple levels of existence. If life is a fundamental divine attribute, its manifestations cannot be confined to a single terrestrial species. Limiting life to humanity alone would conflict with the boundlessness of divine self-disclosure. From this perspective, extraterrestrial life is not merely conceivable but constitutes a plausible expression of the infinite vitality inherent in the divine act of creation. The study further examines Qur’anic verses and narrational reports that may support, or at least accommodate, the possibility of life beyond Earth. Verses such as “And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth and whatever living creatures He has dispersed throughout them” (Qur’an 42:29), “He creates what you do not know” (16:8), and the recurrent Qur’anic expression “Lord of the worlds” (rabb al-ʿālamīn) are interpreted as suggesting a cosmos populated by multiple realms of life. In addition, several narrations in Shiʿi sources refer to the existence of numerous worlds, conscious beings inhabiting other cosmic systems, and even civilizations beyond Earth. While such narrations do not constitute empirical evidence, they align coherently with the philosophical and mystical principles discussed and reinforce the theological openness of the Islamic tradition toward cosmic plurality. In its final section, the article critically reexamines the notion of humanity as the “noblest of creatures.” It shows that the Islamic intellectual tradition does not offer a unanimous position on this matter. While some scholars maintain human superiority, others assign this status to angels, and still others emphasize the absence of any decisive scriptural proof. From a philosophical standpoint, especially within the Avicennian framework, humanity is defined not by biological form but by rationality, free will, and moral responsibility. Accordingly, if extraterrestrial beings possess intellect, volition, and ethical capacity, they may be regarded as “human” in the philosophical sense, regardless of their physical constitution or ecological context. Their existence would therefore not undermine human dignity but would instead expand the scope of theological anthropology. The article concludes that Islamic theology is not threatened by the hypothesis of intelligent extraterrestrial life. On the contrary, it is well equipped to incorporate such a possibility without compromising core theological commitments such as divine unity or human dignity. The acceptance of extraterrestrial life invites a broader and more inclusive understanding of creation, moral agency, and humanity’s place in the cosmos. In this way, the study contributes to the emerging field of Islamic astrotheology and demonstrates the capacity of Islamic thought to engage constructively with contemporary scientific and philosophical developments.  

Abstract Extended abstract
The principal question of this study is to demonstrate how the relationship between the Creator (al-Khāliq) and the created beings (al-makh‌lūqāt) in Islamic philosophy and theology bears directly upon the possibility of revelation (waḥy) and prophethood (nubuwwa). More specifically, I aim to show which interpretation of the distinction between al-Ḥaqq (the Real or the Divine) and creation can refute Deism and provide a fundamental metaphysical explanation for the possibility of divine revelation. In the tradition of Muslim theologians, the possibility of revelation and prophethood is contingent upon the possibility of divine governance and communication with the created world. For if there were no ontological affinity (sunkhiyya) or existential continuity between al-Ḥaqq and creation, any kind of divine governance or effusion of grace (fayḍ) would be impossible or meaningless. Such a view, in effect, leads to Deism—that is, belief in a non-interventionist God. This article seeks to answer which conception of the relationship between God and the world can negate Deism and, in turn, offer a philosophical account of the possibility of revelation and prophethood.
In the first part of the paper, I show that the question of revelation in the Islamic tradition has been discussed under the problem of the “relation between al-Ḥaqq and creation.” Most theologians, in order to preserve divine transcendence (tanzīh), and based on the literal reading of Qurʾānic verses, have affirmed an absolute disjunction between God and creation. However, the denial of any kind of commonality entails the denial of divine governance, for governance presupposes a kind of affinity and accessibility. If there is no ontological kinship between the Creator and the creature, the possibility of communication, knowledge, and revelation is altogether excluded.
I then refer to Ibn Sīnā’s position and show that his philosophical system contains two distinct tendencies: one Aristotelian, emphasizing the essential disjunction between the Creator and creation, and another Neoplatonic, grounded in the doctrine of emanation (ṣudūr wa fayḍ), which posits a kind of ontological continuity between cause and effect. If the first interpretation is adopted, Avicennian philosophy culminates in disjunction, thereby negating the possibility of divine governance and revelation. However, if the second reading is accepted, an existential continuity between the Creator and the created can be assumed, rendering the possibility of effusion and revelation intelligible (Ibn Sīnā, 1371: 41).
I then turn to Mullā Ṣadrā’s view regarding the tashkīk al-wujūd (gradation of being). According to Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn, the distinction among existents is of a gradational nature, meaning that being, though one in reality, manifests itself in various degrees of intensity and weakness (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1368: 1/855; Sabzawārī, 1369: 2/112). This gradation constitutes the very principle of commonality: unity and multiplicity are realized within each other (Zunūzī, 1378: 1/265; Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1416: 18). However, even tashkīk itself admits two major interpretations: “generic unity” (waḥdat sin‌khiyya) and “pervasive unity” (waḥdat siryāniyya). In the article, I show that the generic interpretation of gradation ultimately reverts to disjunction, since it treats commonality as merely conceptual and reduces unity to a mental abstraction. Consequently, no real and actual unity exists among the degrees of being; only a general concept of commonality is formed in the intellect. Thus, generic unity cannot serve as a metaphysical basis for a real relation between God and the created order (Miṣbāḥ-Yazdī, 1366: 1/342).
In contrast, the pervasive unity of being—the authentic Ṣadrian interpretation of gradation—is a real, external, and actual unity (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1368: 2/327). In this view, wujūd (existence) is a single reality that pervades all degrees of being and extends from the highest level, the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd), to the lowest level of contingent beings (mumkināt) (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1368: 2/93; 7/2; 8/280, 332, 127; Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1416: 242). In other words, multiplicity is realized within the one existence itself, not in opposition to it (Jawādī Āmulī, 1386: 8/248). Accordingly, waḥdat siryāniyya establishes a genuine ontological continuity between God and the cosmos, wherein the degrees of existence are arranged hierarchically from the most intense to the weakest. This perspective negates disjunction and affirms a kind of “identity-in-distinction” between the Creator and creation.
In the middle section, by examining the doctrine of Deism, I show that within this worldview, God is conceived merely as a prima causa—the initial creator who, after bringing the universe into being, exercises no governance over it (Barbour, 1362: 2). In Deism, the relationship between God and the world is severed, and consequently, revelation and prophethood become impossible. I argue that the tendency toward Deism is, in fact, the metaphysical consequence of adopting either the doctrine of disjunction or that of generic unity, as both ultimately deny the possibility of divine communication and providence. Therefore, the only theory capable of explaining the possibility of divine governance and revelation at the metaphysical level is the doctrine of the pervasive unity of being (waḥdat al-wujūd al-siryāniyya).
In the final analysis, I argue that if the unity of being is understood as siryāni (pervasive), then God is existentially and actually present throughout all levels of being—a presence that implies neither ḥulūl (immanence in the pantheistic sense) nor ittiḥād (substantial union), but rather a longitudinal and gradational presence. Thus, divine governance and revelation are not external interventions in the cosmic order but modes of manifestation (tajallī) of the same pervasive unity that flows from the highest to the lower degrees of being. This unity guarantees the metaphysical possibility of communication between Creator and creature and provides a philosophical foundation for understanding revelation and prophethood.
In conclusion, I maintain that within the Islamic philosophical tradition, the only way to overcome Deism and affirm the possibility of revelation and prophethood is by adopting tashkīk al-wujūd, interpreted as waḥdat siryāniyya. In this framework, God, while utterly transcendent and self-sufficient, is nonetheless immanently present within the fabric of being and continuously governs the world. This existential presence makes possible the ongoing reality of revelation and divine communication with humankind. Hence, waḥdat siryāniyya not only resolves the philosophical problem of the relationship between Creator and creation but also furnishes a metaphysical ground for the theological doctrines of revelation and prophethood.
Accordingly, the present study seeks to demonstrate that:
1. The disjunctive and generic readings of existential distinction logically lead to Deism.
2. The pervasive interpretation of tashkīk al-wujūd provides an ontological continuum between al-Ḥaqq and creation, thereby refuting Deism.
3. The philosophical defense of revelation and prophethood in the Islamic tradition is possible only on the basis of waḥdat siryāniyya
This conclusion, while reaffirming the principles of ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliyah (Transcendent Theosophy) concerning the gradation of being, opens a path for re-articulating Islamic theology in response to contemporary deistic and secular perspectives—one in which God is not an isolated or silent creator but an ever-present and active reality permeating all degrees of existence and creation.
 

Abstract Extended abstract This study employs an analytical-critical approach to examine the logical possibility or impossibility of the principle of "revelation" within the framework of "Deistic theology." The origin of this inquiry lies in the fundamental opposition between two paradigms: on the one hand, Deism, which, relying exclusively on "natural reason" and a belief in the "cosmological self-sufficiency" of the world, negates any divine intervention and direct communication (including revelation) after the initial creation; and on the other hand, revelatory theism, which emphasizes the possibility and actual occurrence of God's voluntary and guiding communication with humanity through revelation. The findings of this analysis indicate that Deism's negative stance regarding revelation rests on three invalid presuppositions: first, a restrictive view of God's communicative power; second, the assumption of an inherent conflict between reason and revelation; and third, the reduction of the concept of revelation to a "violation of natural laws." The fact that the Deistic intellectual edifice is built upon these unsound foundations leads it toward four internal aporias (logical impasses), which destabilize the internal coherence of this system of thought. Deists, on the one hand, acknowledge a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and purely good – a God possessing all attributes "worthy of worship" – yet on the other hand, by absolutely denying any subsequent voluntary act and communication on His part with the world, they effectively empty these attributes of any practical relevance. This position leads to a "degradation of the image of God" and presents a reduced theology in which God is likened to an "absent watchmaker." The fundamental question is: How can one simultaneously affirm God's infinite power but consider Him incapable of an act such as "speaking" to His creatures – an act which does not necessitate the violation of any logical or metaphysical law? This perspective entails a "voluntary reductionism" of divine power. Moreover, if the creation of the world – especially a world containing rational and volitional beings – has a wise purpose, the Creator's absolute indifference to guiding these creatures toward that end either indicates the "futility" of the act of creation or an "ethical neglect" on the part of an all-good God. Both conclusions violate His attributes of wisdom and benevolence. Deism presents "Universal Reason" as a complete substitute for revelation, claiming that this autonomous reason is sufficient for knowing all necessary truths concerning God and ethics. However, the history of philosophy and the unresolved disagreements among philosophers on fundamental issues such as proving the immortality of the soul are clear testaments to the inadequacy of pure reason. This reason, in addition to its vulnerability to psychological and social obstacles, faces a more structural challenge known as "The Problem of Criterion": Reason requires a criterion to distinguish true beliefs from false ones, but justifying that very criterion leads either to circularity or to an infinite regress. Therefore, reason severed from any transcendent source of knowledge lacks a firm foundation for attaining certainty in the realm of metaphysics. Deists attempt to derive objective ethical principles through observation and inference from "nature". However, this approach faces a fundamental contradiction: on the one hand, Deism denies any divine guidance or continual intervention in nature, portraying it as an autonomous system reliant on mechanical laws (such as the evolutionary process based on natural selection). On the other hand, it seeks to deduce obligatory commandments like justice, self-sacrifice, and benevolence from this system, which lacks inherent ethical purposiveness. The question is: How can values that often require transcending individual self-interest be extracted from a process whose core is based on "the survival of the fittest" and competition? This explanatory gap indicates that establishing an objective and binding morality seems to necessitate reliance on a source beyond the material nature- revelation. Deism regards human reason as a divine gift but blocks the possibility of any supra-rational explanation or complement to this gift. If God is all-good and wise, having bestowed this remarkable faculty (reason) upon humanity, is it not natural that He would also wish to provide, directly and clearly (through revelation), the necessary guidance for directing this reason? In other words, denying revelation implies that a God who is subtle and all-aware (who, according to verse 14 of Surah Al-Mulk, is more aware of His creation than they are of themselves), despite His knowledge of human perplexity and need for guidance, refrains from offering the most direct form of guidance. This is incompatible with the conception of God's active wisdom and benevolence. In contrast to these impasses, the article outlines an alternative model titled "The Model of Wise Communication". In this model, a relational and dependency-oriented ontology replaces Deism's dualistic and independence-oriented perspective. Accordingly, the world is not like an independent clock but is in a state of continuous existential dependence on its Creator. Revelation, within this framework, is not an alien "intervention" from without but the culmination and natural manifestation of this very existential connection in the realm of consciousness and guidance. Revelation is part of God's eternal wise plan, which operates in harmony with the laws of nature, yet at a transcendent level, to guide volitional beings toward their perfection. This perspective dissolves the artificial conflict between "God's action" and "natural law." The absolute negation of revelation in Deism is based on erroneous presuppositions that lead to internal contradictions in the theological, epistemological, ethical, and anthropological domains. The way out of this impasse is the acceptance of "public revelation," which includes innate human nature (fiṭrah), foundational moral intuitions, and universal spiritual experiences. This form of divine disclosure, embedded within the very structure of creation and human nature, can fill Deism's gaps without violating its fundamental principle (in its specific sense) and provide the groundwork for its internal evolution and constructive dialogue with revelatory religions.