Extended abstract
The principal question of this study is to demonstrate how the relationship between the Creator (al-Khāliq) and the created beings (al-makh‌lūqāt) in Islamic philosophy and theology bears directly upon the possibility of revelation (waḥy) and prophethood (nubuwwa). More specifically, I aim to show which interpretation of the distinction between al-Ḥaqq (the Real or the Divine) and creation can refute Deism and provide a fundamental metaphysical explanation for the possibility of divine revelation. In the tradition of Muslim theologians, the possibility of revelation and prophethood is contingent upon the possibility of divine governance and communication with the created world. For if there were no ontological affinity (sunkhiyya) or existential continuity between al-Ḥaqq and creation, any kind of divine governance or effusion of grace (fayḍ) would be impossible or meaningless. Such a view, in effect, leads to Deism—that is, belief in a non-interventionist God. This article seeks to answer which conception of the relationship between God and the world can negate Deism and, in turn, offer a philosophical account of the possibility of revelation and prophethood.
In the first part of the paper, I show that the question of revelation in the Islamic tradition has been discussed under the problem of the “relation between al-Ḥaqq and creation.” Most theologians, in order to preserve divine transcendence (tanzīh), and based on the literal reading of Qurʾānic verses, have affirmed an absolute disjunction between God and creation. However, the denial of any kind of commonality entails the denial of divine governance, for governance presupposes a kind of affinity and accessibility. If there is no ontological kinship between the Creator and the creature, the possibility of communication, knowledge, and revelation is altogether excluded.
I then refer to Ibn Sīnā’s position and show that his philosophical system contains two distinct tendencies: one Aristotelian, emphasizing the essential disjunction between the Creator and creation, and another Neoplatonic, grounded in the doctrine of emanation (ṣudūr wa fayḍ), which posits a kind of ontological continuity between cause and effect. If the first interpretation is adopted, Avicennian philosophy culminates in disjunction, thereby negating the possibility of divine governance and revelation. However, if the second reading is accepted, an existential continuity between the Creator and the created can be assumed, rendering the possibility of effusion and revelation intelligible (Ibn Sīnā, 1371: 41).
I then turn to Mullā Ṣadrā’s view regarding the tashkīk al-wujūd (gradation of being). According to Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn, the distinction among existents is of a gradational nature, meaning that being, though one in reality, manifests itself in various degrees of intensity and weakness (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1368: 1/855; Sabzawārī, 1369: 2/112). This gradation constitutes the very principle of commonality: unity and multiplicity are realized within each other (Zunūzī, 1378: 1/265; Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1416: 18). However, even tashkīk itself admits two major interpretations: “generic unity” (waḥdat sin‌khiyya) and “pervasive unity” (waḥdat siryāniyya). In the article, I show that the generic interpretation of gradation ultimately reverts to disjunction, since it treats commonality as merely conceptual and reduces unity to a mental abstraction. Consequently, no real and actual unity exists among the degrees of being; only a general concept of commonality is formed in the intellect. Thus, generic unity cannot serve as a metaphysical basis for a real relation between God and the created order (Miṣbāḥ-Yazdī, 1366: 1/342).
In contrast, the pervasive unity of being—the authentic Ṣadrian interpretation of gradation—is a real, external, and actual unity (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1368: 2/327). In this view, wujūd (existence) is a single reality that pervades all degrees of being and extends from the highest level, the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd), to the lowest level of contingent beings (mumkināt) (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1368: 2/93; 7/2; 8/280, 332, 127; Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1416: 242). In other words, multiplicity is realized within the one existence itself, not in opposition to it (Jawādī Āmulī, 1386: 8/248). Accordingly, waḥdat siryāniyya establishes a genuine ontological continuity between God and the cosmos, wherein the degrees of existence are arranged hierarchically from the most intense to the weakest. This perspective negates disjunction and affirms a kind of “identity-in-distinction” between the Creator and creation.
In the middle section, by examining the doctrine of Deism, I show that within this worldview, God is conceived merely as a prima causa—the initial creator who, after bringing the universe into being, exercises no governance over it (Barbour, 1362: 2). In Deism, the relationship between God and the world is severed, and consequently, revelation and prophethood become impossible. I argue that the tendency toward Deism is, in fact, the metaphysical consequence of adopting either the doctrine of disjunction or that of generic unity, as both ultimately deny the possibility of divine communication and providence. Therefore, the only theory capable of explaining the possibility of divine governance and revelation at the metaphysical level is the doctrine of the pervasive unity of being (waḥdat al-wujūd al-siryāniyya).
In the final analysis, I argue that if the unity of being is understood as siryāni (pervasive), then God is existentially and actually present throughout all levels of being—a presence that implies neither ḥulūl (immanence in the pantheistic sense) nor ittiḥād (substantial union), but rather a longitudinal and gradational presence. Thus, divine governance and revelation are not external interventions in the cosmic order but modes of manifestation (tajallī) of the same pervasive unity that flows from the highest to the lower degrees of being. This unity guarantees the metaphysical possibility of communication between Creator and creature and provides a philosophical foundation for understanding revelation and prophethood.
In conclusion, I maintain that within the Islamic philosophical tradition, the only way to overcome Deism and affirm the possibility of revelation and prophethood is by adopting tashkīk al-wujūd, interpreted as waḥdat siryāniyya. In this framework, God, while utterly transcendent and self-sufficient, is nonetheless immanently present within the fabric of being and continuously governs the world. This existential presence makes possible the ongoing reality of revelation and divine communication with humankind. Hence, waḥdat siryāniyya not only resolves the philosophical problem of the relationship between Creator and creation but also furnishes a metaphysical ground for the theological doctrines of revelation and prophethood.
Accordingly, the present study seeks to demonstrate that:
1. The disjunctive and generic readings of existential distinction logically lead to Deism.
2. The pervasive interpretation of tashkīk al-wujūd provides an ontological continuum between al-Ḥaqq and creation, thereby refuting Deism.
3. The philosophical defense of revelation and prophethood in the Islamic tradition is possible only on the basis of waḥdat siryāniyya
This conclusion, while reaffirming the principles of ḥikmat al-mutaʿāliyah (Transcendent Theosophy) concerning the gradation of being, opens a path for re-articulating Islamic theology in response to contemporary deistic and secular perspectives—one in which God is not an isolated or silent creator but an ever-present and active reality permeating all degrees of existence and creation.