Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Jostarhaye Falsafeh Din)

Abstract The proposed solutions to the problem of evil can be broadly categorized into two overarching groups: a) defense and b) theodicy. In an initial formulation, the aim of presenting a defense is to demonstrate that a particular articulation of the problem of evil fails to show the incompatibility or improbability (implausibility) of theism. By contrast, a theodicy seeks to provide a plausible theistic account of why God commands or permits the existence of evil.
Some philosophers of religion, such as Swinburne, regard the project of theodicy as both possible and desirable. On the other hand, philosophers like Alvin Plantinga—who are themselves theists—tend to question the accessibility and adequacy of theodicies. Moreover, the problem of theological evil can be distinguished into three types: a) the theoretical problem of evil, b) the existential problem of evil, and c) the practical problem of evil. The theoretical problem concerns the logical and epistemic relations among propositions about God and His attributes, as well as propositions about evil. A common formulation of this problem asks: How can the existence of evil be reconciled with the existence of an all-perfect God? In a widely accepted taxonomy, the theoretical problem subdivides into two variants: the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil. The existential problem of evil concerns abstract propositions insofar as they pertain to human experiential life; it is not reducible to purely theoretical dispute but addresses the pain and suffering that individuals (and animals) endure. The question here is how a person can, in practice, endure evils to which they have been subjected while preserving a meaningful life and maintaining a continuing relationship with God. The practical problem of evil asks how, given the evils that afflict human society, one might diminish the intensity and scope of these evils and circumscribe their deleterious consequences. Typically, well-intentioned individuals and charitable institutions confront this problem and engage in practical efforts to combat evil.
Accepting this tripartite distinction leads to the conclusion that each problem requires its own appropriate method; it is not feasible to resolve all of these issues with a single approach. While the existential and practical problems of evil are typically addressed with the aid of clinical counselors, psychologists, or religious exhorters, solving the theoretical problem of evil necessitates theoretical and intellectual work by philosophers and theologians to analyze the problem with precision and to offer a coherent solution.
Recently, a critical approach to theodicy has emerged, termed “anti-theodicy.” Given that most criticisms of theodicy in continental philosophy have been framed within that milieu, critics have often not attempted to present a clear formulation of each critique or to specify a preliminary taxonomy of the cluster of criticisms. These critiques are sometimes categorized into three families: ethical critiques, epistemological (or pre-philosophical) critiques, and metaphysical critiques. In the present discussion, I focus solely on what I regard as the most salient methodological criticisms, outlined below.
a) Merely theoretical and abstract approach: Proponents of theodicy are charged with isolating the issue to the theoretical problem of evil, thereby neglecting the practical dimensions and confrontations with actual evil and its tangible harms. Conversely, advocates of theodicy tend to treat evil as a mental construct and overlook the external reality of evil and its concrete harms.
b) A second-order (observer) stance: Theodicists frequently speak from an external vantage point, never placing themselves in the position of victims of evil or those who actually suffer. Theodicies tend to treat evil not as a lived, first-person experience but as the experience of others, narrated by someone who reports the experiences of others.
c) Evasion of tragic language: Pain and suffering are inextricably linked to tragedy, and the observer’s discourse about them is, in a sense, tragic. By contrast, theodicy’s discourse is non-tragic and is thus ill-suited for empathy and for alleviating the sufferer’s afflictions. To address this criticism effectively, the preferred idiom is that of affect and felt experience; the theoretical and scholarly language characteristic of theodicy may lack practical efficacy.
d) Denying the mysterious aspect of evil: Theodicies effectively seek to solve problems that are not amenable to rational principles by this very method. They aim to render evil and suffering intelligible, whereas, at their deepest level, these phenomena are “mysterious” matters—beyond human capacity for analysis and comprehension.
Several considerations can be advanced in response to these criticisms. The divergence between theodicy and anti-theodicy rests on a fundamental disagreement within the domain of meta-philosophy concerning the nature, aims, and tasks of philosophy. Apparently, theodicists, who are largely situated within the analytic tradition, regard at least part of philosophy’s task as solving theoretical questions, while the implicit presupposition of proponents of anti-theodicy is that the sole task of the philosopher is to address practical (not theoretical) and concrete (not abstract) problems. Yet they never provide a compelling methodological justification for preferring their meta-philosophical stance over that of the theodicists.
Moreover, the distinction between the theoretical problem of evil and the practical problem of evil, along with their respective repercussions, deserves more serious treatment. If this distinction is respected, then the complete elimination of the theoretical problem of evil and its solutions (theodicies) would hold no meaningful force. Furthermore, adopting a second-order stance regarding evils should not foreclose the possibility of adopting a first-order stance, especially since, in some cases, one’s belief in the theoretical ideas arising from a second-order study of evils can aid in determining an appropriate first-order approach.
Additionally, the stronger claim of mystery attributed to evils by anti-theodicy critics has not been demonstrably established, and weaker interpretations of that claim do not conflict with the usefulness and reasonableness of theodicy work. Leaving aside these points, there appears to be a significant methodological error in anti-theodicy: an implicit or explicit tendency toward metaphysical essentialism regarding what theodicy is. The anti-theodicy project presupposes a unitary conception of “theodicy” that manifests uniformly across, or will manifest across, all intellectual traditions. In other words, given the diversity of theoretical markers that fall under the label “theodicy,” it seems that anti-theodicy proponents frequently treat all such theories as if they share a single underlying structure, or, equivalently, imply that the objections that may be raised against some of these theories apply universally to all of them.

Abstract Reza Davari Ardakani stands as one of the foremost figures in contemporary Iranian philosophy, whose intellectual project engages critically with the intertwined realities of religion, tradition, identity, and modernity. In contrast to the dominant theological traditions of the Islamic world and the analytic philosophy of religion rooted in the Western context, Davari articulates an approach to religion that is historically situated, collectively experienced, and deeply interwoven with the cultural and linguistic foundations of Iranian life. For Davari, religion is not reducible to a corpus of individual beliefs, abstract doctrines, or codified legal norms. Rather, it is a living, historical phenomenon-a shared horizon through which a community sustains collective memory, transmits meaning across generations, and shapes its identity. The central premise of Davari’s thought in this area is that religion cannot be grasped adequately if divorced from the historical and cultural tradition within which it is embedded. This conviction permeates his critique of what he calls “imported philosophy of religion,” namely, the transplantation of Western, primarily Christian-analytic categories into an Iranian-Islamic intellectual landscape without due regard for its distinctive historical rationality and experiential forms. Such uncritical transfer, Davari argues, yields an abstracted conception of religion-one stripped of its linguistic, poetic, and ritual vitality-thereby severing the connection between religion and its role as a unifying force in collective life. Methodologically, this study employs the framework of critical social theory to investigate the philosophical underpinnings and implications of Davari’s reading of religion. In doing so, it situates his work within both the broader currents of Islamic philosophy (with explicit debts to al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Suhrawardi) and continental philosophy, particularly Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics. Al-Farabi’s integration of philosophical rationality with the institutional and symbolic realities of civilizational life provides Davari with a model for understanding religion as a cultural-historical organizer of social life. Heidegger’s attention to the historicity of thought and the centrality of language informs Davari’s emphasis on the experiential and poetic dimensions of religiosity. The extended analysis reveals several key conceptual distinctions that define Davari’s approach. Foremost among them is the separation between “historical religion” and “abstract religion.” Historical religion refers to religion as lived and enacted-a dense complex of language, ritual, narrative, and collective memory lived out in a historically specific community. Abstract religion, by contrast, emerges when religion is reduced to doctrinal propositions, legal injunctions, or individual mystical experience detached from communal-historical contexts. Davari warns that the dominance of abstract religion undermines the integrative social role of religion, producing atomized believers and weakening cultural cohesion. Closely related to this is Davari’s nuanced differentiation between religion as a horizon of meaning, shari‘a (its juridical and institutional embodiment), and faith as existential involvement. For him, din functions as the encompassing cultural-linguistic framework within which shari‘a and faith find coherence. Extracting either from this overarching horizon results in conceptual distortions and practical fragmentation. In addressing modernity, Davari refrains from framing it as an unqualified adversary of tradition. Instead, he conceives modernity as a new historical horizon, one that necessarily enters into tension and dialogue with inherited traditions. His discourse critiques “instrumental rationality” (in the Habermasian sense) for hollowing out meaning and decoupling reason from its cultural and historical embeddedness. At the same time, he calls for a “historically-conscious rationality” that preserves the lived richness of tradition while responding to the demands and crises of the contemporary world. This article’s contribution lies in systematically charting the intersections of Davari’s thought with the philosophy of religion, particularly in its non-analytic, culturally grounded mode. The findings can be summarized as follows: 1. Historical-Collective Grounding of Religion: Davari foregrounds the historical and communal nature of religion, countering both theological abstraction and purely individualist spiritualities. 2. Critique of Philosophical Imports: He resists the transplantation of Western analytic philosophy of religion without adaptation to the Iranian-Islamic historical rationality, advocating for a “localized” philosophy of religion. 3. Integration of Poetic Language and Religious Life: Davari identifies language, especially in its poetic mode, as a primary medium of religious presence, alongside ritual and narrative. 4. Reassessment of Modernity: Rather than rejecting modernity wholesale, he engages with it philosophically, interrogating its presuppositions and seeking pathways for a creative re-founding of meaning in Iranian life. The article argues that Davari’s thought opens alternative horizons for the philosophy of religion in Iran, moving beyond both uncritical traditionalism and reductive modernist reinterpretations of religion. His insistence on the primacy of the lived, collective, and historical dimensions of religious life offers a framework capable of engaging with contemporary identity crises, cultural disorientation, and the erosion of shared memory. In this sense, the study concludes, Davari’s work not only enriches Iranian philosophical discourse, but also invites a broader rethinking of the very possibilities and limits of the philosophy of religion when transplanted across civilizational boundaries.  

Abstract The concepts of peace and war, along with other related terms such as peaceful coexistence, tolerance, forbearance, or conflict and strife, must be counted among the most significant concepts in human life, as they pertain to various political, military, legal, philosophical, and social domains. What is evident is that throughout human history, all the great prophets, religious leaders, social reformers, philosophers, and even many rulers have declared the establishment of peace among individuals and nations as their foremost objective and emphasized its necessity. The issue of peace cannot be separated from other lofty and worthy human values such as freedom, justice, security, and transcendence. It has a profound and extensive connection with human nature, reason, perception, as well as ethics and virtue (al-Farabi, 1995: 120). Khawaja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (1201-1274) is among the earliest Islamic thinkers who presented comprehensive and thought-provoking discussions on peace and war in his works. Khawaja Naṣīr lived in an era marked by the Mongol invasions and plunder on one side and the bigotry and narrow-mindedness of the Abbasid rule on the other. Consequently, he was deeply concerned with safeguarding religion and homeland—rescuing religion from the distortions and oppression of the Abbasids and the homeland from the clutches of the Mongols. This led him to thoroughly explore the discourse of peace in his writings.
From Khawaja Naṣīr’s perspective, peace is an attainable concept, achievable both at the individual and societal levels. Inner peace and tranquility are prerequisites for social peace, as societal harmony cannot be realized unless individuals first attain peace within themselves (al-Ṭūsī, 1369: 298). In the Christian world, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was the first to propose the democratic peace theory in his work Perpetual Peace. The numerous and prolonged wars and conflicts in the West, along with the disputes between the Church and rationalists, significantly influenced Kant's pacifist thought. Kant believed that the only way to achieve peace was to abandon war and self-interest in both personal and social spheres. Thus, in Kant's philosophy, peace is defined in its negative sense—the absence of war (Kant, 1991: 93).
This research employs a descriptive-analytical method with a comparative approach to elucidate and analyze the foundations of Khawaja Naṣīr and Kant's perspectives on the issue of peace, explain their respective theories, and examine their proposed solutions for achieving peace. It further aims to highlight the distinctions and similarities in their philosophical approaches to conceptualizing peace.
Khawaja Naṣīr’s understanding and explanation of peace is not merely limited to the absence of war and conflict but is rooted in a complex and coherent system of religious beliefs and ethical values. From his perspective, peace is not only a social and political necessity but also a foundation for achieving individual and collective happiness and perfection. This, in turn, creates a suitable environment for human flourishing in all dimensions (al-Ṭūsī, 1369: 69). According to Khawaja, humans are both the origin and purpose of governance. On this basis, he emphasizes human freedom and the right to choose, ethical governance, political rationality, and the rule of a wise sovereign (al-Ṭūsī, 1336: 72). Khawaja believes that social stability stems from a government's ethical and human-centered approach, fostering peace and harmony in both domestic and foreign relations while avoiding tension and conflict.
Kant also believed that a peace which does not eliminate the grounds for future conflicts is not true peace at all but merely a temporary truce. This is because the concept of genuine peace runs deeper than the mere absence of temporary conflict. Throughout Kant’s works, there is a profound connection between politics, morality, and reason, and he analyzes peace based on these three principles. According to Kant, humans can bring an end to conflict and strife by applying the principles of practical reason and rationality. On the other hand, there are certain categorical imperatives in ethics that every individual can recognize through practical reason, guiding them toward peace (Mearsheimer, 1990: 54).
The issue of peace and war has long been among the most significant issues debated and reflected upon by thinkers from various religious and intellectual perspectives. Khawaja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in the Islamic world and Immanuel Kant in the Christian world have presented profound and thought-provoking discussions on this issue. In his discourse on peace, al-Ṭūsī seeks to articulate the concept of a “peaceful city,” where individuals can flourish alongside others in society and contribute to its prosperity and progress. He emphasizes the necessity of interaction among different groups and schools of thought within society to achieve peace. Al-Ṭūsī also highlights moral virtues such as empathy, cooperation, and benevolence as essential factors in strengthening social bonds and fostering peace and harmony in society. Kant, through his theory of perpetual peace, aims to provide humanity with a path toward a world free from war and violence. This theory not only stresses the importance of establishing republican governments and adhering to ethical principles but also underscores the necessity of cooperation and interaction among nations as a fundamental condition for achieving peace. Al-Ṭūsī regards peace-seeking as an innate human tendency, believing that all human faculties inherently strive for balance. In his view, peace—rooted in divine and natural principles—constitutes an essential aspect of human identity. In contrast, Kant approaches peace from a materialistic perspective, viewing it as a social necessity for states rather than an innate human desire. He adopts a liberalist stance, considering peace not as a natural inclination but as a rational mechanism to safeguard state interests and security.
 

Abstract The question of whether belief in God can be rationally justified remains one of the central and most controversial issues in contemporary philosophy of religion. Pascal’s Wager offers a distinctive approach by appealing not to theoretical arguments such as ontological, cosmological, or teleological proofs, but to a practical, decision-theoretic reasoning based on expected utility. According to Pascal, even if the probability of God’s existence is low, the rational agent should choose belief, since the potential gain—eternal bliss—is infinite, while the loss of disbelief, if God exists, would be infinite and irreparable. This article critically examines the epistemological, ethical, and metaphysical dimensions of Pascal’s Wager through an analytical–conceptual approach. The study also situates Pascal’s reasoning within the broader historical and intellectual context of seventeenth-century rational theology, showing how his probabilistic approach reflects both the mathematical innovations of his time and the crisis of faith in early modern Europe. From an epistemological perspective, the study argues that Pascal’s reasoning fails to provide an adequate basis for genuine faith. A crucial distinction is drawn between belief and faith: while belief is a cognitive attitude responsive to evidence, faith, in the theistic sense, implies trust, commitment, and a transformation of the whole person. Salvation, according to traditional theistic frameworks, is linked to faith rather than mere belief. Moreover, belief, as a mental state, is not subject to direct voluntary control and thus cannot authentically arise from prudential calculation alone. Therefore, pragmatic reasons may justify the act of believing in a limited practical sense but cannot ground epistemically warranted belief. The paper further shows that this gap between practical rationality and epistemic justification reveals an important philosophical tension: if belief is not an act of the will, the Wager cannot bridge the divide between rational self-interest and genuine conviction. In this regard, the Wager resembles other voluntarist approaches in religious epistemology that overestimate the capacity of the will to command assent. From an ethical point of view, adopting religion for the sake of expected reward undermines the moral integrity of belief. Pascal’s Wager, when viewed through the lens of the ethics of belief, risks reducing faith to a form of instrumental reasoning—treating God as a means to an end rather than as the ultimate good. Such an approach can foster intellectual dishonesty and religious hypocrisy, where belief is motivated by fear or personal benefit rather than the pursuit of truth. In virtue-ethical terms, true religious belief must be grounded in intellectual virtues such as sincerity, humility, and a love of truth. Pascal’s model, however, substitutes these virtues with utilitarian incentives, thereby diminishing the intrinsic moral value of faith. Socially, widespread acceptance of such reasoning could result in superficial religiosity and institutionalized hypocrisy, weakening the moral and spiritual fabric of religious life. The ethical critique thus emphasizes that faith, to be genuine, must arise from authenticity and moral integrity, not from prudential self-interest. In a broader sense, the Wager’s ethical weakness demonstrates the difficulty of reconciling religious commitment with a purely consequentialist framework. From a metaphysical perspective, the article highlights the well-known “many gods” objection, which exposes a critical flaw in Pascal’s binary model (“God exists” / “God does not exist”). The actual religious landscape is pluralistic, encompassing diverse conceptions of God or the divine, each promising distinct rewards or punishments. Consequently, betting on one particular deity or religion—say, the Christian God of seventeenth-century Europe—cannot be rationally justified without assuming prior theological commitments. If multiple theistic frameworks are possible, then wagering on any single one carries the risk of infinite loss should another be true. This problem undermines the decision-theoretic coherence of Pascal’s reasoning. Moreover, the Wager offers no epistemic or metaphysical criterion for preferring one religious option over another, making its practical utility negligible in a religiously plural world. The paper also notes that modern pluralist and comparative theologies further complicate Pascal’s dichotomy by expanding the field of possible “divine options,” making any singular bet epistemically arbitrary.   Conclusion The study concludes that although Pascal’s Wager possesses formal coherence and historical significance as a pioneering instance of pragmatic theism, it fails to provide a sufficient or independent justification for religious belief. Epistemologically, it cannot generate genuine faith; ethically, it risks promoting insincere and self-serving religiosity; and metaphysically, it collapses under the weight of religious pluralism. Nonetheless, the Wager retains heuristic and motivational value: rather than serving as a proof for God’s existence, it may function as a psychological or rhetorical encouragement for believers in moments of doubt. Its enduring philosophical importance lies not in demonstrating the rationality of belief ex nihilo, but in revealing the interplay between reason, will, and faith within the human condition. The analysis suggests that future philosophical engagement with Pascal’s Wager should shift from its apologetic ambitions to its existential and phenomenological implications—namely, the way it illuminates the human quest for meaning amid uncertainty, the limits of rational calculation in matters of faith, and the paradox of belief that seeks both evidence and grace.  

Abstract Introduction The concept of prophethood constitutes a central pillar in both Islamic and Christian theology, serving as the primary nexus for divine-human communication. Within the philosophy of religion, prophecy engages critical issues of epistemology, authority, and the means by which transcendent truth is conveyed to humanity. Although Islam and Christianity share a common Abrahamic heritage and acknowledge a lineage of prophets, their interpretations of the prophetic role, the content and nature of revelation, and the finality of the prophetic mission diverge significantly. These divergences reflect deep philosophical commitments concerning the nature of God, His relationship with creation, and the path to human salvation or felicity. This paper aims to elucidate these fundamental differences through a structured comparison.   1. Prophethood in the Christian Tradition The Christian understanding of prophethood is deeply rooted in the Hebrew Bible and undergoes a profound theological evolution in the New Testament, centering on the person and work of Jesus Christ. However, in Western philosophy of religion, this conception is not without its philosophical challenges. As Davison (2022) notes, despite the prophet being an intermediary between God and the people in Christian thought, various factors have constrained this relationship largely to God imparting knowledge about future events through the prophet. Consequently, this understanding of prophethood becomes entangled with complex philosophical issues such as divine foreknowledge and human free will. Furthermore, the non-fulfillment of certain prophecies, such as the promised resurrection of Christ as heralded by Christian leaders, has historically posed a significant challenge to Christianity.   1-1 Prophethood in the Old Testament A prophet primarily functioned as a spokesperson or messenger for God, calling the covenant people back to faithfulness. Their mission was holistic, encompassing social, moral, and spiritual dimensions. Therefore, the main functions of a prophet are: preaching and exposition, encouragement and consolation, and the prediction of the future, which can be categorized into two primary dimensions: messianic prophecy and eschatological prophecy. 1-2 Prophethood in the New Testament The advent of Jesus Christ represents a paradigm shift in the concept of prophecy and revelation in Jesus Christ as the ultimate prophet and revelation, the gift of prophecy in the church and eschatological fulfillment.   2. The Islamic Perspective on Prophethood The role and mission of prophets include calling to tawhid, delivering divine law, providing a practical model, reminding of the fitrah, and conveying news of the unseen, the most pivotal of which is the Resurrection. Islam holds distinct doctrines regarding the closure of the prophetic cycle and the status of Jesus. First, Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is explicitly designated as the Seal of the Prophets, signifying that he is the final prophet in a long and venerable chain. Second, Jesus is revered as one of the greatest prophets, born of the Virgin Mary, performing miracles by God's permission, and referred to as a "Word from God" and the "Messiah." However, he is unequivocally a human servant of God, not divine nor a literal son of God.   3. Comparative Analysis The Purpose of Prophethood in Islam is to guide humanity to pure monotheism and provide a comprehensive, abiding Shari'ah for individual and collective life, with a strong emphasis on law, justice, and righteous action as the path to felicity in this world and the next. In Christianity, the purpose is to prepare humanity for salvation through faith in Jesus Christ, with an emphasis on divine grace, redemptive sacrifice, and a personal relationship with God. The Role of the Prophet in Islam is primarily that of a law-bringer, a warner, a teacher, and a practical model. He delivers a verbatim revelation in the form of a book and establishes a complete way of life. In Christianity, the prophet serves as a foreteller and an interpreter of God's will, primarily pointing towards the coming Messiah. Jesus, as the Messiah, transcends the role of prophet; he is the savior himself, the object of faith, and the mediator of the new covenant. The Status of Prophets in Islam is that they are infallible (ma'sum) in receiving and delivering revelation and are exemplary in character, but they are entirely human servants of God. In Christianity, prophets are inspired holy individuals. Jesus, however, occupies a unique ontological status as the God-Man, the incarnate Son of God, who is both the agent of creation and the object of worship. Finality of Prophethood: In Islam it is institutionally and legislatively finalized with Muhammad (pbuh). The Quran is the eternal, preserved, and final revelation. In Christianity, the revelation is consummated in the person and work of Jesus Christ. The "gift of prophecy" may continue as a non-legislative, edificatory practice within the Church.   4. Concept of Revelation In Islam is the verbal and literal transmission of God's eternal speech to the prophet, perfectly preserved in the Arabic text of the Quran. In Christianity, the revelation is fundamentally understood as God's self-disclosure, which finds its supreme expression in the person of Jesus Christ. The concept is more personal and incarnational than verbal and legislative. Philosophical Necessity of Prophethood: A profound philosophical justification for prophethood, particularly emphasized in Islamic theology, lies in its unique epistemological role. While human intellect and innate disposition can deduce the existence of a Creator and grasp general ethical principles, they are incapable of providing detailed, certain, and motivating knowledge of the metaphysical realm, most notably the Resurrection. The nature of the afterlife—a future, certain, yet entirely non-empirical event involving resurrection, judgment, paradise, and hellfire—lies completely beyond the domain of inductive reasoning, scientific inquiry, and pure philosophical demonstration. Only divine knowledge can encompass it. Therefore, divine wisdom (hikmah) necessitates that God convey this crucial knowledge to humanity. Prophets serve as the sole authoritative and reliable channels for this information, delivering the "glad tidings" and "warnings" concerning the Day of Judgment. This knowledge of the Ma'ad is not ancillary; it fundamentally shapes human anthropology, provides the ultimate context and accountability for worldly life, and makes the detailed guidance of the Shari'ah existentially meaningful and purposeful.

Abstract Extended abstract Paul Tillich, the twentieth-century existentialist theologian and philosopher, stands among those who sought to lead theology out of the confines of rigid dogmatic concepts toward an existential understanding of the sacred. For him, revelation is neither a metaphysical event nor a historical report of a divine message, but a fundamentally ontological reality - a question not about the existence or non-existence of a being called God, but about Being itself in the Heideggerian sense. From this perspective, revelation is no longer the transmission of analyzable propositions or doctrines; rather, it is the manifestation of the hidden, a momentary disclosure of the unconditional truth that becomes possible only within the depth of human existential experience. Within this framework, the way human beings encounter the divine determines the destiny of that encounter. If one’s approach remains at an instrumental or objectifying level, revelation is reduced to an ontic phenomenon and is thereby emptied of meaning. In contrast, when the human subject transcends the boundaries of conditioned concepts and opens itself to the unconditional, revelation is realized as an event of ontological openness - not merely the communication of a message, but a transformation in the very mode of being. Tillich also conceives the central problem of monotheistic religions in terms of their relation to “the Unconditional.” Throughout the history of thought, this reality has appeared under various names - the Idea of the Good, the Absolute Spirit, or the Ultimate Truth - yet it has always been threatened by idolatry, understood as the sanctification of material and historical determinations. Whenever humanity seeks to pour the Unconditional into finite and tangible forms, the danger of idol-making arises. For this reason, Tillich distinguishes between authentic monotheism and idolatrous tendencies: genuine monotheism is realized in transcending every finite form, whereas idolatry attempts to imprison the infinite within shape and matter. Within this horizon, Tillich understands the finality of revelation in Jesus Christ not in a temporal or historical sense, but in a philosophical and essential one. Christ, in his view, represents the “final revelation” because he embodies within himself the negation of all spatial and temporal limitations - not implying that no revelation could occur before or after him, but that in his event, the very essence of revelation in its pure philosophical sense becomes manifest. Jesus becomes the Christ through his passage beyond the confines of individuality and corporeality, through a self-emptying that reveals divine being; idolatry, on the other hand, strives to deify that very finite person and to reduce the Unconditional once more to the conditional. To articulate this understanding, Tillich turns to the concept of the symbol, which he sets in contrast to the sign. A sign merely indicates something beyond itself, while a symbol participates in the very reality it reveals. Religious language, therefore, is symbolic: its words, rituals, and even images are not passive instruments of reference but active participants in the expression of the sacred. Through this lens, faith itself becomes a symbolic act - an existential participation in ultimate meaning rather than mere assent to doctrinal propositions. In this context, Tillich establishes a special affinity between revelation and art. Literature and art, especially in the twentieth century, have, through their existential orientation, opened new channels for symbolizing the divine. Art, in this sense, is not a direct representation of God but a language for the experience of the impossible - an attempt to articulate what cannot be contained within logical propositions. If revelation is the disclosure of truth, art, too, may be regarded as a revelatory event, since it unveils a hidden truth through sensory forms. In his analyses of death, sin, anxiety, and salvation, Tillich shows that the existential dimensions of human life can be expressed only through symbolic language. Just as Dante in the Inferno dramatizes the structures of spiritual ruin through vivid imagery, or Kafka renders the anxiety of meaninglessness and guilt through allegorical narrative, the language of art does not state propositions but reveals experience. According to Tillich, when such images are taken literally, they become absurd; but when seen as symbols of existential truth, they lead us toward an understanding of the divine. Thus, Tillich’s theology navigates a path between theological dogmatism and secular relativism. Against those who would reduce revelation to the language of science or logic, he insists that revelatory truth does not belong to the order of verifiable propositions. Yet he also resists those who dissolve the sacred into mere poetic metaphor. The symbolic language of religion is neither mere linguistic play nor empirical description; it constitutes a mode of discourse in which human existence encounters divine reality. Consequently, art and literature, for Tillich, may serve as dwellings for the event of revelation, since they translate existential human experience into symbolic form. The experience of suffering, anxiety, guilt, or redemption within a work of art corresponds to what traditional theology calls the “manifestation of the holy.” Tillich perceives this kinship between aesthetic and religious experience as an opportunity to rethink theology itself - as a realm in which faith is not the acceptance of doctrinal systems but an existential response to the Unconditional. Ultimately, Tillich understands revelation not as an external or historical occurrence, but as an inner movement within human consciousness - a moment in which the hidden becomes manifest, though never confined within any final form. Art, literature, and the symbolic language of religion are all expressions of this unveiling. Revelation, in this sense, is the continuation of humanity’s primordial quest for meaning and truth. Hence, Tillich arrives at a theology that, while faithful to the monotheistic tradition, remains profoundly open to dialogue with the modern world - a theology that seeks revelation not beyond history, but in the very depths of human experience.  

Abstract Introduction In the intellectual traditions that have explained the epistemological aspects of revelation, the truth of revelation has always been regarded as authentic theological reality; although methodological differences among different schools are inevitable. Comparative philosophy in understanding the essence and nature of revelation in Islam and Christianity is a worthy subject. Our goal is to address the similarities and differences between revelation as a source of religious knowledge in Islam and Aquinas's view of realist belief in God. In the history of religious thought, we witness philosophical debates regarding the concept of revelation and assessments of whether it is real or not. Can the truth of revelation be understood, and can a certain understanding of its reality be achieved through reason? Is revelation a subjective concept that reason is incapable of explaining and can only be perceived in the heart? In this discussion, we will compare divine revelation in Islam and Christianity, with an emphasis on the model of Thomas Aquinas.   Epistemological Method of Revelation in Islam In Islam, the meaning of revelation is the word of God, which the angel of revelation gradually recited to the Prophet (PBUH) and the scribes of revelation wrote down, the final manifestation of which is the Quran. The Quran is the reference for religious knowledge, the establishment of laws, and the standard of morality. The Prophet (PBUH) brought forth a good character, and the divine prophetic tradition complemented the revelation in guiding the Islamic nation and other nations. In Islamic philosophical traditions and various readings of epistemological methods of revelation, the Quran is not limited to the Quran alone, and reason has been used as a synergistic force in explaining and understanding the Quran. In Islam, commentators have prevented the distortion of written revelation over time. In the science of hadith, hadith scholars have prevented the entry of fabricated hadiths into the field of Islamic sciences. The emergence of the views of Akhbarism and Usuli in Islam, with the superiority of the Usuli who placed the principle of rational ijtihad in accepting or rejecting revealed texts as the center of their reading, over the Akhbarians who gave more importance to the appearance of the revealed text, indicates that in the epistemological method of revelation, the interaction of reason and revelation has exemplary acceptance. The common thread between these two schools is the adaptation of revelation to external reality. In such a way that the truth of revelation is current in human life and does not have a purely mental aspect. The rulings constructed from the revealed texts and arising from the Prophetic tradition contain a map of the path of the followers and the manifestation of the divine will in the legislative guidance of man and guarantee his happiness. There is a kind of passionate belief in this approach: the belief that divine guidance in the form of revelation has a real basis in life and is rooted in the absolute wisdom and benevolence of God.   Theistic realism in Aquinas' model of faith Aquinas elaborated a model of faith in which God, as the subject of faith and divine truth, is objectively knowable. He insisted on the non-contradiction of faith and reason. Aquinas believed that faith reveals truths that are beyond the full comprehension of reason but never contradict reason. Aquinas' definition of faith is: ''Faith is the theoretical certainty that God exists." He attributes to the believer a fundamental orientation toward the divine and considers faith, like knowledge, to be reassuring. In Aquinas' view, God is uncompounded and non-propositional. On the other hand, the reliance of propositional foundations of belief on revelation and the support of its divine evidence leads to their confirmation. John Locke also defined faith as the affirmation of any proposition that comes from God “in some extraordinary manner of communication”. These views are acceptable to Muslim scholars because revelation provides a solid foundation for both the theoretical and practical aspects of faith. Reason confirms revelation in both its content and appearance. Human knowledge considers the signs of God and the works of divine wisdom in the Quran as true statements. One aspect of the similarity between Aquinas' model and Islam is the belief in propositional truth claims based on authoritative divine evidence. For Aquinas, revelation is the source of knowledge of divine truths and lies beyond the reach of reason. However, reason has the ability to prove the existence of God and explain revealed truths by establishing philosophical arguments, though it is not capable of proving revealed truths. Aquinas divided truth into two types: "rational" and "faithful," both of which are compatible with reason. Aquinas' theistic realism holds that revealed truths are beyond the bounds of subjective beliefs and exist in the realm of objective realities. Divine law, which includes natural and revealed laws, is established based on divine will and has a real and objective basis in human life, and its ultimate goal is to guide humanity towards perfection, eternal happiness, and union with the divine essence. Aquinas had a presupposition of faith in mind, believing that divine grace has made universal grace flow through the affirmative beliefs of mankind, and that the basis of faith is "pre-accepted belief." But do all believers have access to evidence that proves the rationality of their faith? Do believers have the ability to assess the truth or falsehood of such evidence? Penelhum states: Although what one acknowledges in faith includes many things that are not about God himself, one acknowledges them because they are revealed by God. In this regard, Benacerraf considers Descartes' philosophy, which asserts that based on the teachings of the Bible, one must believe that God exists and, on the other hand, one must believe in the Bible because it was revealed by God, to be true. However, he questions how this argument can be presented to unbelievers, as they may accuse us of "circular reasoning" and "infinite regress". Plantinga presented the Aquinas-Calvin model, highlighting the commonalities between Calvin's model of special knowledge and Aquinas's model (faith as a truth revealed by God) as well as the differences between the two models (whether faith should be considered knowledge). Any attempt to understand an independent reality in human language is fallible, subject to revision in light of future experience, and carries a certain degree of uncertainty. In line with the school of dynamic theology, the concept of faith in God is constantly changing, evolving, and progressing. From a biological perspective, the reason for this can be seen in the evolution of the human brain and mind. The sharing of new ideas and theorizing raises more questions in theological philosophy, compelling philosophers to redefine new theoretical and practical foundations for truth-seeking minds.   Comparative Philosophy of the Reality of Revelation in Islam and the Viewpoint of Aquinas Both traditions have a similar reading of the importance of revelation as the main source of religious knowledge and theistic realism, and they acknowledge the objective reality of God and divine truths in the form of revelation. While they consider reason to have a fundamental role in understanding revelation, they also consider its limitations and believe that pure divine revelation guides man to the truth. Conversely, Islam believes that the direct source of revelation is God, and the written text of revelation is the Quran, which, along with the prophetic tradition, guides humanity towards truth and happiness, but Aquinas reduced the level of guidance for humanity to the Bible and the tradition of the Church. He used Aristotelian philosophy to structure his theological realist faith. Islam encompasses the individual and social affairs of humans, but in Aquinas' model, divine law guarantees individual salvation and observance of moral principles by believers, and has a more limited scope. Aquinas believes in the independence of reason and considers divine faith to be the transcendent of reason, while in Islam, revelation and tradition are central, and reason is a tool for understanding and receiving the truths emanating from them and has a complementary role in this area.   Conclusion A comparison of the epistemological method of revelation within the scope of Islamic law and Aquinas' model of faith shows that in both traditions, despite structural and methodological differences, theism and faith in the object of faith, which is God, are realist and have a real determination in the life, future, and happiness of mankind. Both views consider God as an objective and transcendent reality, and revelation is a means of divine knowledge and understanding. Both traditions of thought have been and continue to strive to guide humanity towards ultimate truth and happiness. The common goal of these two philosophical readings is to discover the mysteries of existence and the place of humanity in the sacred realms of divine knowledge. May philosophers of religion and theologians from both heavenly and non-heavenly traditions find common ground in their views in constructive religious discourses and, free from bias, provide their followers with a path that leads to the understanding and comprehension of sublime human concepts, including faith.

Abstract Across major religious traditions, revelation has served as the grounding experience that brings the divine into relation with human beings and establishes the foundations of communal faith. Linda Zagzebski’s account explains how this primordial encounter with the sacred is preserved and made accessible through the ongoing life of religious traditions. Not only do such traditions convey doctrinal and legal content, but they also embody the collective memory, practical norms, and spiritual dispositions that form a community over centuries. Religious authority thus emerges as an epistemic, ethical, and affective structure shaping the believer’s worldview and motivating her religious practices. Zagzebski distinguishes three principal modalities through which revelatory experience is transmitted. In the first model, the chain of testimony—originating with the direct witnesses of revelation—creates a historical bridge between the initial event and later generations. The scriptures and canonical narratives that gradually formalize these testimonies protect them against oblivion while simultaneously grounding the identity of the religious community. Yet, as she notes, this model remains vulnerable to distortions arising from temporal distance, linguistic change, and interpretive interference. The second model emphasizes the possibility of immediate encounter with the divine within the believer’s own spiritual life, independent of extensive reliance on tradition. Particularly echoed in strands of Protestant theology, this approach suggests that revelation can remain a living address of God to persons today, granting them assurance without dependence on historical mediation. Zagzebski acknowledges the existential and spiritual power of this model but cautions that purely individual experiences lack the interpretive safeguards that tradition offers and thus may succumb to error, confusion, or self-deception. The third model, which she favors, integrates personal experience and communal continuity by understanding tradition itself as a living field of revelatory presence. Tradition is internalized within the believer through worship, liturgical practices, ethical formation, scriptural engagement, and communal interpretation. Under these conditions, revelation is not relegated to a distant past, nor reduced to subjective spiritual episodes, but becomes a dimension of the ongoing religious life in which believers participate. The community cultivates intellectual and moral virtues—such as humility, honesty, and conscientiousness—that enable it to remain oriented toward truth and resistant to the corruptions that threaten both individuals and institutions. Zagzebski’s broader epistemology of virtue provides the conceptual underpinning for this view. Since human beings are inherently dependent on one another for knowledge, trust in epistemic authorities is not a defect of rationality but a necessary feature of our intellectual condition. Trusting a tradition can therefore be an expression of epistemic humility and responsible agency, provided that the tradition itself manifests truth-directed virtues that sustain its authority across time. Tradition shapes the affective and volitional aspects of the believer as well: it does not merely persuade the intellect but forms the heart, directing desire and devotion toward the divine source of revelation. This account also acknowledges the need for critical discernment: traditions can err, and the collective life of a community must include mechanisms of self-correction. Internal dialogue, appeal to foundational sources, and comparison of spiritual experiences all serve as means by which a tradition tests and refines its claims to truth. What ultimately anchors trust, however, is the believer’s deep moral and religious perception—a “personal response to divine truth,” as Zagzebski puts it—through which faith becomes both cognitively warranted and existentially transformative. The resulting picture presents a defense of the rationality of religious commitment within a pluralistic world. Reliance on tradition does not amount to blind conformism but expresses a mature alignment of intellect, emotion, and will with a truth-seeking community. Revelation, in this view, is neither confined to an inaccessible past nor limited to extraordinary experiences of isolated individuals; it is realized continuously in the lived spiritual practices of a tradition shaped by epistemic virtues. Thus, trusting one’s religious tradition can be a rational and virtuous response to the human need for divine guidance, even while recognizing the legitimacy of other traditions’ analogous claims and the ongoing responsibility for reflective self-assessment.

Abstract Extended abstract Stoic theologia rationalis aligns with the totality of the causal order of the cosmos and situates itself at the intersection of nature, reason, and the sacred. In this framework, revelation is conceived as the gradual actualization of the universal Reason (Logos) within the individual mind-a process both rational and ethical, unfolding within the context of nature. Nature itself is a living and law-governed entity in which Logos is immanent. The individual human’s nature forms part of the cosmic order, and God, nature, and humanity constitute an integrated whole. Within the shadow of Logos, the particular intellect (human reason) progresses toward its perfection, namely, union with the universal Reason; this actualization constitutes what may be termed rational revelation. Such revelation, in this perspective, is realized through a disciplined ethical practice, intellectual focus on apprehending the cosmic order, and the inner experience of unity with the universal Reason. This approach emphasizes harmony with the rational foundation of being rather than a disconnection from nature.   Introduction The question of the relationship between revelation and human reason has long occupied a central position in the philosophy of religion and philosophical epistemology. In revealed traditions, particularly within the Abrahamic religions, revelation is understood as a direct communication from God to select individuals, often surpassing the reach of natural reason and human experience (Motahhari, 2023: 124). While this understanding confers authority and sanctity to revelation, it also poses a fundamental challenge to philosophical rationalism regarding the possibility, mechanism, and epistemic legitimacy of revelation. Historically, attempts have been made to rationalize or naturalize revelation-from Neoplatonic philosophers who interpreted revelation as the manifestation of truth in the higher soul, to Islamic philosophers such as al-Farabi and Avicenna, who conceived revelation as a complete form of active intellect (Sa’idi Roshan, 1996: 35). These approaches, though differing in perspective, all seek to bridge the divide between reason and revelation. This study, employing a descriptive-analytical methodology and a careful re-examination of foundational Stoic texts, aims to delineate the conceptual structure of this rational inspiration-a structure that appears to reside at the intersection of nature, reason, and the sacred. The central issue under investigation concerns the manner in which this inspiration is realized and its relationship to the overarching causal order of the cosmos. If one conceives of revelation as the manifestation of absolute truth within the human sphere, two fundamental questions arise: first, does such manifestation require a discontinuity from the natural order? Second, can human reason, as part of nature and the rational order of existence, alone apprehend and receive such manifestation? The Stoic philosophical response to both questions is rigorously rational and coherent.   The Concept of Revelation and the Role of Nature in Rational Revelation In the Stoic system, revelation is not a supernatural event but the gradual actualization of the universal Reason within the individual mind, occurring through rational and ethical praxis embedded in nature. Stoics, through detailed analyses of key concepts such as “nature,” “reason,” and “cosmic unity,” demonstrate the capacity of their school to develop a reason-centered model of receiving revelation-one that, although devoid of the supernatural and personal characteristics of prophetic revelation, is fully equivalent in ontological and epistemological terms. Within this framework, Logos is not merely the ordering principle of being but the universal Reason, the very essence of existence, active in all constituents, including the human intellect, through which a rational and causal relation with absolute truth is established (Aurelius, 2008: 104, 29). Nature itself is a living and law-governed text in which Logos is woven (Mantzanas, 2018: 84). Possessing inherent divine qualities and functional properties, nature is intimately linked with God, such that God is synonymous with the cosmos, operating as the “cosmic Reason” within both nature and human life, with all entities ordered accordingly. Consequently, individual human nature is a microcosmic part of the cosmic order, illustrating that God, nature, and humanity form a coherent whole (Mantzanas, 2018: 83). Rational apprehension of the natural order thus constitutes a form of rational revelation: existence resembles a text authored by the universal Reason, with the particular intellect tasked with its reading and contemplation. Rational practice, therefore, extends beyond mere introspection to include a deep understanding of the structure of being and alignment with its laws. In this sense, nature is not merely an object of knowledge but a locus of rational revelation, observable in natural forms, the motions of elements, and the causal and teleological arrangements of beings. This perspective blurs the boundary between revelation and science, positioning reason as the instrument for reading existence and comprehending universal Reason.   The Evolutionary Process of the Particular Intellect and the Ascension of Rational Revelation In Stoic philosophy, the movement of the particular intellect toward universal Reason is an intensive, intrinsic process and constitutes the telos of reason itself (Witt, 1931: 103). This orientation reflects both causal and teleological relations: the particular intellect is inherently a potential carrier of the truth contained in Logos, the rational and formative principle of being. Universal Reason, as the active and creative cause, brings the particular intellect into the realm of possibility; yet this emanation is not a mere top-down imposition but a recursive and teleologically directed process that guides the particular intellect toward its perfection, namely, union with the universal Reason (B. Gould, 1965: 15–17). For a proper ontological understanding of this process, one must consider the Aristotelian principles of potentiality and actuality, reinterpreted within Stoicism. Logos functions as the law of nature, and nature’s purpose is to operate according to these laws. Accordingly, both the human soul and nature itself move inherently and harmoniously with Logos, such that the particular intellect, grounded in potentiality, actualizes the universal Reason through a telos-aligned and harmonized progression. This harmony is neither a mystical union nor a mystical incarnation but an intellectual sharing and unification in which the individual mind is exposed to the radiance of truth, transitioning from potentiality to actuality. From this perspective, the particular intellect and universal Reason constitute two levels of a single rational reality. Universal Reason embodies necessary, absolute, and luminous truth, which not only generates the particular intellect but also guides it toward perfection. This guidance represents a rational and unitive attunement with the totality of existence, an internal apprehension wherein human reason transcends individual and material limitations to achieve an immediate and certain intuition of truth (Witt, 1931: 103–104). In this schema, reason and revelation are not opposed but appear in a progressive and developmental relationship: the particular intellect, through an inner trajectory of perfection, aligns with universal Reason, actualizing what is termed rational revelation. This perspective reintegrates what is beyond reason into the very structure of reason, rendering revelation its ultimate manifestation.   Conclusion In light of the foregoing, revelation in this Stoic paradigm is neither exceptional nor supernatural but the outcome of the internal harmonization of human reason with the rational structure of being, emphasizing rational unity rather than ontological discontinuity. Revelation, in this sense, is actualized through ethical and rational practice (Sandbach, 1975: 69). Through self-purification, alignment with nature, and the cultivation of wisdom, human reason attains the capacity for union with universal Reason, thereby enabling the reception of truth (Aurelius, 1906: 15–18). This process, in the context of Stoic epistemology, entails three fundamental stages: (1) ethical purification and removal of impediments of the soul; (2) the intellectual focus necessary for comprehending the order of the cosmos; and (3) the internal experience of unity with universal Reason, wherein the particular intellect attains clarity and actuality. This actualization constitutes what may be termed “rational revelation” in the Stoic philosophical system-i.e., the actualization of the continuum of universal Reason within the individual, independent of the supernatural or discontinuity from nature. A crucial distinction between Stoic rational revelation and Abrahamic prophetic revelation lies in the nature of the intellect’s relation to truth. This distinction manifests both ontologically and epistemologically. Accordingly, two forms of inspiration can be discerned: first, personal and selective inspiration associated with prophetic revelation in Abrahamic traditions, conveying a sacred message to particular recipients; second, rational and progressive inspiration in Stoicism, accessible to any individual pursuing the rational-ethical path to its telos. In prophetic revelation, the divine message descends with minimal mediation, perceived as exceptional, extraordinary, and beyond natural causality, often rendering human reason passive or subordinate. In contrast, Stoic rational inspiration is not received from above but manifests from within the intellect itself; reason provides the medium through which revelation unfolds, a process intrinsic, rational, and natural, realized as the intellect develops toward its full actualization. This approach acknowledges reason not as subordinate but as the very instrument of its own perfection. When the particular intellect, through discipline, contemplation, and purification, aligns with universal Reason, the union is achieved. In sum, within the Stoic paradigm, revelation can be understood as the specific actualization of the particular intellect in the light of universal Reason—not a phenomenon beyond reason, but the fulfillment of its telos. This conception permits a reconsideration of the nature and mechanism of revelation within an immanent rational horizon, presenting a perspective in which revelation harmonizes with the rational foundations of existence rather than disrupting them.  

Abstract Extended abstract
This article examines the place of the doctrine of "purgatory" in Catholic theology and its role in the formation and evolution of medieval economic and social structures. Purgatory in the Catholic tradition is a temporary stage of suffering and purification after death that allows believers to be cleansed of venial sins before entering heaven. This concept was established in the works of the Church Fathers and important councils such as Lyon II, Florence, and Trent, and became an official doctrine. Accordingly, the Church was able to create a spiritual-economic system that influenced individual behavior and social institutions by utilizing this belief.
In the medieval economy, the Church was not only the largest landowner but also influenced trade and economic relations with its monasteries and moral teachings. The doctrine of purgatory allowed the Church to create a kind of "salvation economy" through indulgences, alms, and endowments, where material actions such as paying money or donating land acquired spiritual value and were interpreted as reducing the suffering of purgatory. This logic of exchange between this world and the afterlife shaped people's economic behavior and led them to actions such as buying indulgences, making vows, preparing religious wills, and giving to charity. For the lower classes, alms and vows were an alternative to buying indulgences, and the Church created funds to collect these donations. Such a situation transformed the religious anxiety of the faithful into manageable economic actions and directed financial decisions with the goal of salvation in the afterlife.
At the institutional level, belief in purgatory gave rise to religious brotherhoods, endowments, charities, and religious hospitals. These institutions developed with the financial support of the faithful, turning the Church into one of the largest landowners and economic powers. The Church also relied on the doctrine of purgatory to strengthen its judicial authority and to present social and economic transgressions as threats to salvation in the afterlife. This increased the legitimacy of religious courts and the Inquisition, making the Church the arbiter of both worlds. Popular culture was also influenced by this doctrine.
Ordinary people knew about purgatory through religious art, rituals, and sermons, and images of souls in fire and communal prayers were part of their lived experience. Taking advantage of this popular belief, the Church organized rituals such as All Souls' Day and communal prayers, which were both a source of psychological relief for the survivors and a source of finance for the Church. The result of the analysis shows that the doctrine of purgatory was not only a theological concept but also a socio-economic mechanism that allowed the Church to create a stable spiritual-economic order. This doctrine is a clear example of the influence of metaphysical concepts on material relations and shows how religion can create a new logic of exchange in the economy. At the same time, abuses such as the trade in indulgences gave rise to reformist reactions. However, a distinction must be made between the institutional exploitation of the Church and the sincere religiosity of the people.