Essays in Philosophy of Religion (Jostarhaye Falsafeh Din)

Abstract This paper investigates the epistemological role of miracle (muʿjiza) and infallibility (ʿisma) in grounding the authority of prophetic testimony in the thought of Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. In the contemporary world—dominated by scientific rationality, empirical verification, repeatability, and falsifiability—religious beliefs face serious epistemic challenges. Unlike scientific knowledge, which relies on repeatable experiments and observable data, religious belief is often based on historical testimony and claims about the unseen. This raises a central question: how can one rationally trust the testimony of a prophet who claims access to a transcendent and unobservable realm? Ṭūsī emerges as one of the most significant thinkers who constructed a systematic, rational framework for grounding trust in prophetic testimony. Drawing on Avicennian philosophy and Imāmī kalām, he proposes a three-stage model: (1) establishing rationally the existence of God, the possibility of revelation, and the necessity of prophecy; (2) confirming a particular prophetic claim through miracle, understood as divine authentication; and (3) grounding the continuing epistemic authority of the prophet’s statements in infallibility. This triadic model demonstrates that for Ṭūsī, belief in prophecy is neither blind imitation nor skepticism, but a rationally justified stance. To contextualize Ṭūsī’s approach, the paper first discusses the epistemology of testimony. Testimony accounts for a substantial portion of human knowledge—covering historical, scientific, and everyday facts alike. Two dominant approaches structure the field: reductionism and anti-reductionism. Reductionists maintain that testimony is justified only when supported by independent evidence, while anti-reductionists argue that testimony is a basic source of knowledge, justified by default unless there is positive reason for doubt. In religious contexts, testimony becomes even more complex due to supernatural content, claims to infallibility, and the moral and existential implications of accepting or rejecting prophetic authority. Ṭūsī’s epistemology of prophecy responds to these challenges in a structured manner. First, he argues that human beings need social life, which requires law, and only a divinely commissioned lawgiver can provide complete and flawless legislation. Moreover, human intellect alone is insufficient for grasping all truths—especially the details of divine commands and the nature of the afterlife—thus necessitating divine guidance. These arguments establish prophecy as rationally necessary, even before addressing any specific prophetic claimant. In the second stage, Ṭūsī defines miracle as a supernatural act accompanied by public challenge (taḥaddī), which is beyond human capacity, inimitable, and occurring exactly as claimed by the prophet. These conditions transform a miraculous event into an epistemic sign. From an epistemological perspective, the miracle functions as external divine certification of the prophet’s truthfulness. Ṭūsī argues that it would be irrational for God to grant the power to perform a true miracle to a liar; thus, the miracle establishes the sincerity and veracity of the claimant. Once a miracle meeting the required conditions is verified, it becomes a sufficient argument for the truth of the prophetic claim. The third stage focuses on infallibility. Ṭūsī defines infallibility as a divine grace that removes the motivation for sin or error while preserving human freedom. Infallibility guarantees that the prophet will not err in receiving, preserving, or conveying revelation. From the standpoint of contemporary epistemology, infallibility can be interpreted as maximal epistemic reliability. In reliabilist terms, the prophet’s cognitive processes consistently generate true beliefs; in virtue epistemology, the prophet exemplifies perfect epistemic virtue, thus possessing supreme epistemic authority. This means that once prophecy and infallibility are established, one is epistemically justified in accepting the prophet’s testimony without needing to examine each claim independently. The article also addresses modern challenges such as religious diversity and Hume’s alleged circularity between miracle reports and prophetic testimony. Drawing on externalist epistemology, the paper argues that the mere existence of competing religious claims does not undermine the justification of a believer’s testimony-based beliefs. What matters is the reliability of the belief-forming process, not universal consensus. Regarding Hume’s charge of circularity, the paper explains that many miracles are reported by multiple independent witnesses, that Hume’s own argument relies on testimony to establish a “uniform experience,” and that in Ṭūsī’s framework, miracles operate alongside other rational premises rather than in isolation. In conclusion, the study demonstrates that Ṭūsī provides a sophisticated and rational model for justifying prophetic testimony. By combining external divine verification (miracle) with internal epistemic security (infallibility), Ṭūsī constructs a framework that bridges classical Islamic theology and contemporary epistemology of testimony. His model offers valuable insights for current debates on religious epistemology, testimonial justification, and the rationality of faith.  

Abstract The verse "Wherever you turn, there is the face of Allah" (2:115) has been pivotal in Islamic theological and philosophical discussions concerning the unity of existence (wahdat al-wujud), divine encompassing, and the nature of God's presence in the world. The verse seemingly suggests a ubiquitous presence of the "face of Allah" in all directions, which, if interpreted carelessly, could lead to anthropomorphic or even pantheistic understandings of God. Razi, recognizing this potential for misinterpretation, prioritizes preventing any inclination towards a spatial understanding of God. He argues that the verse's apparent meaning might create the illusion of God's presence in multiple spatial directions, necessitating a metaphorical interpretation of "face." Razi emphasizes that the verse does not imply God's physical presence in any direction, as God is transcendent and devoid of location, corporeality, or inherence. For Razi, "the face of Allah" cannot denote God's actual presence in a specific direction. Based on Ash'ari theological principles such as the negation of location for God, the complete otherness of creator and creature, and the necessity of interpreting ambiguous verses, Razi attempts to interpret "the face of Allah" in a non-corporeal, non-spatial, and non-existential framework. Aligned with his theological foundations, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi interprets the verse to avoid any existential understanding of God, explaining God's omnipresence as encompassing knowledge. According to Razi's interpretation, nothing escapes God's power, knowledge, and will. He emphasizes the correlation between knowledge and precise action in his works, considering this as the primary evidence for God's knowledge. Razi elucidates the verse by referencing corresponding verses such as 57:4, 58:7, and 43:84. He considers verse 2:115 as crucial in negating corporeality and affirming God's transcendence from material attributes. Consequently, Razi avoids asserting God's "actual presence everywhere," interpreting "the face of Allah" within the realm of divine knowledge and power rather than ontology. In contrast, Mulla Sadra analyzes the verse through his existential philosophy and the doctrine of the "transcendent unity of existence" (wahdat al-wujud). According to Sadra, the personal unity of existence, and the infinitude of God, leaves no room for any "other" to mediate the affirmation of God's knowledge. In this view, God's knowledge is established first, and apart from God's knowledge, nothing can be known, just as apart from God's existence, nothing can exist. The verse expresses the profound reality of God's sustaining and existential encompassing. God is not limited to any location, but His existential effusion is present in all beings. "The face of Allah" is the manifestation of the divine in the levels of existence. In Sadra's mystical view, God is observed in everything and in every direction. Because every being is a ray of God's existence, one can observe the divine face in everything according to one's existential capacity. However, the coexistence of the Creator with creation is not like the coexistence of bodies, or substance and accident, or spatial or temporal coexistence; it is even more intense than the coexistence of existence and quiddity. Mulla Sadra's interpretive and philosophical readings suggest that the verse indicates God's encompassing dominion and coexistence with all things. God's dominion implies that everything other than Him is sustained by Him, and their very existence and all their existential aspects exist through His effulgent bestowal. In Sadra's philosophy, the soul inherently possesses its own world and a dominion similar to its Creator's, which Sadra utilizes in explaining God's knowledge of all things. Thus, Mulla Sadra likens God's knowledge of the entire world to the knowledge of the soul and body.

Abstract Introduction This analytical-comparative study examines three contemporary theological models of divine revelation proposed by Maurice Wiles, Arthur Peacocke, and Denis Edwards. Each thinker fundamentally critiques the traditional "verbal-propositional" view, where God directly transmits words supernaturally by arguing its incompatibility with science, scientific errors in scripture, and need for contextualization.   Maurice Frank Wiles Wiles destabilizes the foundation of the traditional theory of revelation through four main critiques: the incompatibility of supernatural intervention with the scientific worldview, the conflict between errors in the Bible and God's absolute omniscience, this theory's inability to explain the diversity of sacred texts, and its practical inefficacy. His solution is a shift from the model of "verbal transmission" to that of "human interpretation." According to Wiles, divine revelation is not a specific intervention but the general and continuous presence of God in the world. The authors of sacred texts, like art critics interpreting a work, have reflected and interpreted this general presence based on their own cultural and historical contexts. Therefore, the Bible is not the direct speech of God but a record of human experiences and interpretations of encounters with the divine. This perspective explains textual errors and shifts its authority from literalist objectivity towards its historical role in shaping faith communities committed to ethics and social justice.   Arthur Peacocke Peacocke, a scientist-theologian, challenges tradition notably through the lens of kenosis (divine self-limitation) and scientific coherence. Advocating "theistic naturalism," he rejects body-soul dualism, asserting God acts through natural laws and evolutionary processes. Revelation involves "reading the signs" of God in nature and history, constituting a continuum from general to special revelation. Sacred texts are dynamic records to be reinterpreted in light of new knowledge.   Denis Edwards Edwards approaches the issue from a Trinitarian perspective centered on the concept of "the vulnerability of divine love." He criticizes traditional theology for its individualistic interpretation of the Trinity, neglect of this vulnerability, and creation of an artificial duality between God's general and special actions. From his viewpoint, the essence of revelation is the manifestation of intra-Trinitarian love and an invitation for humans to participate in this loving relationship, not merely the transmission of propositions. This love is voluntarily vulnerable, compelling God to act through secondary causes and natural laws. In this model, the Holy Spirit, as the flow of divine love, operates within natural processes (from cosmic evolution to quantum events), and sacred texts are the product of this Spirit's cooperation with human imagination and experience in historical context. Thus, revelation is an interactive, relational process.   Conclusion These theories share a paradigmatic shift: reconceiving revelation from a specific, miraculous event to a universal, natural process. Commonalities include critiquing verbal-propositional models, emphasizing natural explanations, and acknowledging human agency. Distinctions lie in their frameworks: Wiles uses hermeneutics, Peacocke theistic naturalism, and Edwards relational Trinitarian theology. This shift mitigates science-religion conflict and universalizes spiritual experience but raises ongoing questions about textual authority and special divine action, as noted by critics like George Ellis.

Abstract This article examines the role of Prophetic tradition and religious preaching in confronting environmental crises. Inspired by the approach of “practical theology” and through an analysis of the works of Paul Ballard and the Earth Bible group, it demonstrates that the application of sacred texts can integrate environmental ethics into religious sermons. Religious preaching, when accompanied by figurative language and evocative vocabulary, not only reflects the epistemic dimensions of revelation but also transforms into prophetic activism—an activism that, through protest, lamentation, and repentance against the colonization of nature and climate inequality, revives the voice of responsibility and empathy in today’s world.

Abstract Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience have made it possible to empirically investigate religious and spiritual experiences, leading to the emergence of the concept of the neural signature of religious experience. This concept refers not to the localization of religious experience in a specific brain region, but to relatively stable and recurrent network-based patterns of neural activity involving systems related to self-awareness, attention, emotion, and meaning, which co-occur with first-person reports of religious experience. Interpreting such neural signatures, however, raises a fundamental challenge of reductionism, insofar as neural correlates of religious experience may be misconstrued as exhaustive explanations of the experience itself.



The aim of this article is to provide a theoretical analysis of the concept of the neural signature of religious experience and to explore the possibility of a non-reductive framework for its interpretation. Employing a theoretical–analytical approach, the article first reviews contemporary neuroscientific literature on religious experience and clarifies the notion of neural signature. It then examines and comparatively analyzes two influential approaches in this field—one emphasizing the reorganization of self-related neural networks, and the other stressing the distinction between explanatory levels and the methodological limits of neuroscience. On the basis of the strengths and limitations of these approaches, the article proposes a conceptual model grounded in three principles: non-reductive co-emergence, multi-level distinction without disconnection, and the intentional, meaning-directed structure of religious experience.



The findings suggest that the neural signature of religious experience can be understood as the biological dimension of a multi-level phenomenon that requires neural activity for its realization but cannot be fully explained without reference to phenomenological and meaning-oriented levels. Accordingly, identifying neural signatures neither negates nor validates the theological significance of religious experience, but instead provides a framework for a constructive dialogue between neuroscience and theology.

Abstract The Representation of Prophets in Cinema: The Tension Between the Sacred and Earthly Narrative

The cinematic representation of prophets presents significant challenges rooted in the fundamental divergence between religious discourse and cinematic language. In the Abrahamic traditions, prophets are depicted as sacred, infallible, and transcendent figures, whereas cinema, as a narrative and image-based medium, relies on dramatization and humanization. This inherent difference often leads to a tension in which prophetic figures are reduced from a sacred realm to a more earthly and, at times, secular portrayal.

Key challenges include excessive humanization, the marginalization or naturalization of miracles, and the erosion of transcendent religious authority. While such portrayals seek to enhance audience identification, they risk desacralizing prophetic figures and reshaping collective religious understanding. At the same time, cinema’s aesthetic and semiotic capacities enable it to serve as a medium for religious experience, offering new ways of engaging with the sacred.

Through an interdisciplinary analysis of selected films, this article examines the narrative and visual strategies used in representing prophets and argues that cinematic portrayals reflect broader cultural transformations in modern attitudes toward religion. Ultimately, the study highlights both the limitations and possibilities of cinema in negotiating the relationship between sacred tradition and earthly storytelling.