Analysis of Instances of Evil and Their Relation to God

Document Type : Original Article

Author

Professor of Philosophy at Allameh Tabatabai University

Abstract
Introduction
The problem of evil arises from the apparent contradiction between divine attributes, such as omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect benevolence, on the one hand, and the reality of evil on the other. Some solutions to the problem of evil aim to demonstrate that the existence of evil is not incompatible with our understanding of God and His attributes. Another line of analysis questions whether what we perceive as evil is truly evil that conflicts with the divine attributes. If evil exists, we must determine what we can truly classify as evil. At first glance, many things in the world seem to be evil, but a deep and comprehensive analysis often challenges this perception.
 
Methodology
In this research, with a descriptive-analytical method and with a critical approach.
 
Findings
This article discusses four interpretations that consider many instances of evil to be misunderstood: soul-making theodicy, the benefits of evil, the relativity of evil, and the non-existence of evil. However, whether we consider evil to be relative, demonstrate its benefits, deem it necessary for human growth, or consider it non-existent, we ultimately cannot deny the reality of evil. While some things we believed to be evil may not be, this does not prove that no form of evil exists in the world. Each of the four perspectives can only refute certain instances of evil.
If we consider the entire system of existence and the interrelations of beings, it becomes difficult to judge many things as evil. However, from the viewpoint of each creature, anything that hinders their ongoing pattern or disrupts parts of it is perceived as evil, with destruction or death being the ultimate evil. Just as cancer is evil for a person, being destroyed by white blood cells is evil for a microbe. We cannot say that because the slaughter of a sheep provides nourishment for humans, it should not be considered evil for the sheep.
Judgments about the nature of evil can be approached in three ways:

Our judgments about phenomena evaluated in relation to other realities in the world, which are labeled as evil. However, no definitive judgment on the evil nature of any of these matters can be made; rather, it may be “probable” that such an issue is part of the overall evil within the world's system, but it's uncertain whether any of them truly are evil as we call them.
An individual entity's judgment about itself when it perceives a disruption in its previous course of life or its potentially destructive outcome. Thus, it can be asserted that a specific individual diagnosed with cancer at a specific time unequivocally views it as evil.
An individual's judgment about themselves when they sense deficiencies (such as blindness, ugliness, or disability) compared to others. Although such shortcomings may possess positive aspects within the grand scheme of creation, for the person who experiences them, they are unequivocally evil. In other words, a specific individual at a specific time can perceive their deprivations as evil.

Therefore, there are two categories of phenomena that can truly be considered as evil: "adversities" or "deficiencies" that each individual may encounter. This type of evil is related to the individual rather than the entire universe. However, since "change" is an essential characteristic of the material world and an intrinsic attribute of every material being, adversities, which are transformations of the blessings humans possess, are inherent to this world. Change is an inherent necessity of this world. There is no entity that does not possess both static and dynamic aspects. Thus, a material world without "change" is inconceivable, as it would cease to be material. Moreover, since "diversity" is another intrinsic feature of the world, it necessitates that each being has characteristics that others lack. The traits of each being shape its existential identity; hence, the existential limitations of beings (in a diverse world), which constitute their identities, are intrinsic to each being. If a being were to possess certain other characteristics, it would no longer be the same being.
 
Discussion and Conclusion:
Therefore, it is impossible for God to create a material world devoid of "diversity" and "change" while maintaining its material nature. We cannot question why God created a material world that is dynamic and diverse, because a material world inherently implies diversity and change. It is not as though God created a world and then introduced various changes and diversities into it. Thus, we cannot complain to God about why one person was created black and another white, or why one is created wise and another insane. This is just as unreasonable as questioning why one creature was made in the form of an ant and another as a human, or why one entity in the world was created as a stone and another as a knowledgeable human. Similarly, we cannot complain about why one plant was created to grow and bear fruit while another gradually withers and perishes, or why the strength of a child increases over time while another individual's vigor declines with age. This is because change is intrinsic to this world.
Therefore, both differences and transformations are essential attributes of this universe. Consequently, the things that should be truly considered evil are either adversities or differences. The former arises from the intrinsic necessity of this world, namely change and transformation, and the latter from another intrinsic necessity of this world, namely diversity. Eliminating evils would mean eradicating these two fundamental characteristics of the world, an act that falls outside the realm of absolute divine power, as it involves a logical contradiction.

Keywords


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